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ADVERSE POSSESSION AND SUBJECTIVE
INTENT: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
HELMHOLZ
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM*
It might be supposed that there is no longer anything worth saying
with respect to the legal doctrine of "adverse possession." Recently,
however, in an effort to explain "the large volume of litigation on the
subject" between 1966 and 1983, Professor R.H. Helmholz undertook a
survey of the cases decided during that period to "test the possibility that
subjective factors have continued to play an important role in litigation,"
contrary to "the view that looks to pure possession as the relevant test,"
which he characterized as "the dominant view among commentators on
the law of real property."' Professor Helmholz's principle conclusions
are that:
(1) "the accrual of a cause of action" against the adverse claimant
and in favor of the true owner is "irrelevant" in most adverse possession
cases;
2
(2) "the bulk of recent cases require... formulation of the rule [as to
adverse possession so as to recognize] the relevance of the subjective in-
tent of the possessor in determining whether or not he may validly ac-
quire title by the passage of the statutory period [of limitation];3
(3) "[tlhe cases ...do not show that the adverse possessor must
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. S.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, Harvard University.
1. See Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 331-33
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Adverse Possession].
2 Id. at 334-36. Professor Helmholz states that in certain recurring situations in which the
question is whether one party has acquired title by adverse possession, "[t]o approach that question
by asking about the availability of ejectment is to invite laughter." Id. at 335.
3 Id. at 332.
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plead and prove that he [actually] acted in good faith... [b]ut the cases
do clearly show that the trespasser who knows that he is trespassing
stands lower in the eyes of the law.., than the trespasser who acts in an
honest belief that he is simply occupying what is his already."4
At the outset, one should note that the number of appellate cases on
adverse possession decided in the period that Professor Helmholz sur-
veyed is not really excessive when compared, for example, with the
number of appellate decisions during the same period dealing with bail-
ments, 5 a subject as to which one might also expect the law to be so well-
settled as to preclude excessive litigation. Moreover, one should note
that almost half the cases that Professor Helmholz cited as directly sup-
porting his conclusions were intermediate appellate court decisions with
only limited significance as precedents,6 rather than decisions of courts of
last resort. Professor Helmholz's conclusions differ so greatly from gen-
erally accepted views7 as to justify a careful look at the cases on which he
4. Id.
5. The 8th Decennial Digest (1966-1976) and the 9th Decennial Digest, Part 1 (1976-1981)
contain a total of 169 pages devoted to "Adverse Possession," and a total of 112 pages devoted to
"Bailment." In the 8th Decennial Digest, the first three key numbers devoted to "Bailment" include
134 different cases. Although Professor Helmholz examined a total of about 850 appellate opinions,
"[mI]any of the cases bore no relation to the subject" in which he was interested-the subjective
intent of the adverse claimant-and "[t]he variety and complexity of many of the cases disap-
pointed" his "hopes of adopting a statistical approach." Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 333-34.
Although Professor Helmholz cites a substantially larger number of cases, only about 105 cases are
cited as directly supporting his conclusions. See id. at 335 nn.13-15, 338 nn.27-31, 340-41 no. 38-45,
342-48 nn.48-71.
6. SeeAdverse Possession, supra note I at 335 nn.13-15, 338 nn.27-31, 340-41 nn.38-45, 342-48
nn.48-71. Intermediate appellate court decisions obviously cannot change a rule of law established
by prior decisions of the state's highest court. Even when an intermediate appellate court purports
to establish a new rule on a point that the state's highest court has not yet decided, its decisions may
not have statewide precedential value if the intermediate court is divided into panels assigned to
separate geographical districts. And the opinions of many appellate court panels must be viewed
with considerable skepticism in light of the widely varying quality of such panels. Skepticism is
especially necessary in assessing the opinions of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals panels, which have
become a subject of humorous comment among lawyers both in Texas and elsewhere. It is worth
noting that Professor Helmholz cites an inordinate number of decisions from the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals.
7. The "generally accepted views" are those stated in 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 15.2, 15.4 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as AM. L. PROP.]; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 458 (1944); 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY §§ 1142, 1147-1149 (rev. 3d ed. Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as H. TIFFANY]; R. CUNNING-
HAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN]; I W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY ch. 3 (1947). The Walsh treatise is practically identical with 3 AM. L. PROP. Part 15,
ch. 1, because preparation of the latter was originally assigned to Professor Walsh but, some time
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based his conclusions. The remainder of this article is therefore devoted
to an analysis of these cases and a critique of his conclusions.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE "ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION" To ACCRUAL OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
A. In General
Professor Helmholz's conclusion that the accrual of a cause of action
against the adverse claimant is "irrelevant" in adverse possession cases is
based upon his assertion that the courts "focus on whether or not the
trespasser has fulfilled the five positive requirements of adverse posses-
sion: that is, hostility under claim of right, actual possession, openness
and notoriety, exclusivity, and continuity," rather than "looking for the
accrual of a cause of [action in] ejectment." 8 Concededly, these "positive
requirements," which are generally not expressly mentioned in statutes
prior to his death in 1946, was reassigned to R.G. Patton with a suggestion that Mr. Patton should
use the material on adverse possession that Professor Walsh had previously published in the New
York University Law Quarterly. Mr. Patton acted on this suggestion. See 3 AM. L. PROP, supra at
755, explanatory footnote. Chapter 3 of Professor Walsh's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, posthumously published in 1947, also incorporated the same material from the New York
University Law Quarterly articles.
8. Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 334-35. So long as the common-law forms of action
were in use, "ejectment" was the form of action generally available for recovery of the possession of
land, although a "writ of entry" was used for that purpose in Massachusetts from an early date
because it was considered "more simple, convenient and effectual than the action of ejectment." A.
SEDGWICK & F. WAIT, TRIAL OF TITLE TO LAND § 70 (2d ed. 1866) [hereinafter cited as A.
SEDGWICK & F. WAIT]. Moreover, an action performing the same function as "ejectment" but
termed "trespass to try title" was adopted in South Carolina, Alabama, and Texas; it has survived
only in Texas. Id. at §§ 81-92.
At the present time, almost all American jurisdictions have statutory actions to recover possession
of land that have superseded "ejectment," the "writ of entry" and "trespass to try title." It should
be noted, however, that a substantial majority of all the cases Professor Helmholz cites as directly
supporting his conclusions as to the importance of "subjective intent," "good faith," and "bad faith"
involve in substance either an action or a counterclaim by an adverse possessor to "quiet title"
against the record owner. This strongly suggests that in many states, especially in the South and
West, the "quiet title" action has largely superseded the action at law to recover possession of land as
a vehicle for determining whether an adverse claimant in possession of land has acquired title by
adverse possession. Indeed, the leading treatise on equity jurisprudence states that a statutory "quiet
title" action "in many states is the ordinary method of trying disputed titles." 4 J. POMEROY, EQ-
UITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1396 (rev. ed. Symons 1941). In a number of states either a plaintiff in
possession or a plaintiff out of possession may bring a statutory "quiet title" action. See id. listing
the following states as having statutes allowing a "quiet title" action whether the plaintiff is in or out
of possession: Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In these states a statutory "quiet title" action performs the
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limiting the time within which actions to recover possession of land may
be commenced, are the subject of more judicial discussion than the ques-
tion whether a cause of action against the adverse claimant has accrued
to the true owner. But careful reflection on the meaning of these "posi-
tive requirements" should lead to the conclusion that the dichotomy sug-
gested by Professor Helmholz's assertion is false. These "positive
requirements" are, in fact, judicial criteria developed to determine
whether the adverse claimant's conduct gave the true owner of the land a
cause of action for recovery of possession that continued for the full stat-
utory period of limitation before the true owner began such an action.9
functions of both an action at law to recover possession (when the plaintiff is out of possession) and a
suit in equity to "quiet title" (when the plaintiff is in possession).
For an extensive listing of cases cited in Adverse Possession involving, in substance, a "quiet title"
action, see infra notes 239 & 240.
9. The adverse claimant's possession must be such as to give the true owner a right of action
for a continuous period equal to the statutory limitation period. See Sullivan v. Zeiner, 98 Cal. 346,
33 P. 209 (1893); Moss v. Scott, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 271 (1834); Chessman v. Hale, 31 Mont. 577, 79 P.
254 (1905); Lewis v. Pope, 86 S.C. 285, 68 S.E. 680 (1910); Portis v. Hill, 3 Tex. 273 (1848); North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. Spokane, 45 Wash. 229, 88 P. 135 (1907); Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 49 S.E.
409 (1904).
In Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 335 nn.13-16, Professor Helmholz cites three cases to sup-
port his assertion that, in certain adverse possession cases, to approach the question whether title has
been acquired by adverse possession by asking about the availability of ejectment "is to invite laugh-
ter." In fact, however, each of the cited cases can properly be analyzed in terms of "the accrual of a
cause of action." Thus, in Conwell v. Allen, 21 Ariz. App. 383, 519 P.2d 872 (1974), the court held
that "planting and maintaining the grass on the disputed area" did not amount to "open and notori-
ous possession," which is required to give the true owner a cause of action. In Burnett v. Knight,
428 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), the court held that the adverse claimant failed to prove
"exclusive" possession-which is required to give the true owner a cause of action-when use of a
strip of land as a means of ingress and egress by those attending baseball games was of as much
benefit to the owners of the disputed strip and the tract on which the stadium was located as it was to
the adverse claimants, who owned a smaller tract on which the cars that "ingressed and egressed to
the ball games over the disputed strip" were parked. Finally, in Hemon v. Rowe Chevrolet Co., 108
N.H. 11, 226 A.2d 792 (1967), the adverse claimant had planted spruce trees along the edge of the
disputed strip and the trees had later grown until they blocked the true owners' access to the strip.
The court was primarily concerned with the question whether the evidence clearly showed that the
adverse claimants had proven "open, adverse, exclusive and notorious use under a claim of right"
beginning at a time more than 20 years before the true owners brought the action. This concern
clearly indicates that the court attached primary importance to the "accrual of a cause of action."
The court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision that the required possession was
not established early enough to allow the 20-year statutory limitation period to run before the action
was brought.
In each of these three cases, both the stated and the actual ground of the decision was that the
adverse claimant had failed to establish the kind of possession necessary to give the true owner a
cause of action to recover possession of the land in question early enough to allow the running of the
full statutory limitation period.
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Apparently, development of these criteria was at least in part a corollary
of the courts' recognition, early in the nineteenth century, that when the
statute of limitations barred the true owner's right to recover possession
all his other legal and equitable rights, comprising his "title" to the land,
were also extinguished,"° and that the adverse possessor thereupon be-
came the new owner of the land. 1
10. Under American statutes, as under the Statute of James I, there may be some remedies
which are not expressly affected by the terms of the statute. But when the statute extin-
guishes the remedy in ejectment to recover possession, the common law and also equity say
that the possession shall not be questioned by the former owner in any other manner, either
by self-help, by action of trespass, or by a bill in equity...
... As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has pointed out, it would be a strange anomaly to
hold that the law which bars the owner from recovering possession ... should yet leave
him at liberty to assert title in other ways as by action of trespass for mesne profits, by
extra-judicial re-entry or by suit in equity to quiet title, for partition or for an accounting.
It seems a necessary consequence of the policy underlying the limitation acts that one
should be considered to have no right or title when the most essential incident or legal
consequence of title, the right to recover possession, is barred. Hopeless confusion would
result from the recognition of any such anomalous titles, without right of possession, sur-
viving the statute. The maxim that where there is a right there is a remedy may be turned
about .. , so that where there is no remedy there is no right. The only cloud on the
possessor's title is the true owner's right to recover possession by entry or ejectment, or by
some other remedy, and when these remedies are all taken away by the statute or by anal-
ogy thereto, the defect in the possessory title [is] cured.
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 140-41 (1918).
The cases cited by Professor Ballantine include Elmendorf v. Taylor, 25 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152
(1825), and Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 587 (1840). The proposition stated by
Ballantine was established in England by the Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Wm.IV, c.
27.
11. Most of the American limitation statutes do not expressly provide that the former true
owner's title shall be extinguished and a new title created when the statute bars the true owner from
bringing an action. But in a few states, the statutes do so provide, as they have in England since
1833. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.050 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101 (1982); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-5-163, 44-5-164 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.060 (1979) (if adverse claimant has
"connected" title of record); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 15.1-11 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 333
(West 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-7-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-2-105 (1980) (if adverse
claimant claims under color of title that has been of record for 30 years); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. § 5513 (Vernon 1958).
Although California, Florida, Montana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania are also listed as hav-
ing statutes vesting title in the adverse possessor at the end of the limitation period, in Taylor, Titles
to Land by Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L. REv. 551, 563 (1935), none of these states actually has
such a statute. In New Jersey there are 30-year and 60-year statutes of limitations that expressly
provide for vesting of title in the adverse possessor. But these statutes have little practical impor-
tance because New Jersey's 20-year statute of limitations has been held to have the same effect,
although it does not expressly provide for vesting of title in the adverse possessor. See Cunningham,
Real Property, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 249, 251-53 (1954).
Alabama has perhaps the strangest congeries of statutes and legal doctrines relating to adverse
possession. Under ALA. CODE § 828 (1958), after 10 years of adverse possession either under "color
of title" or with the land properly listed for taxation to the adverse possessor, the adverse possessor
may acquire title, although the statute does not explicitly provide for this result. ALA. CODE § 20
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In any case, judicial development of the "positive requirements of ad-
verse possession" was not, as Professor Helmholz asserts, a consequence
of the failure of most courts to distinguish adverse possession from "pre-
scription."' 2 Professor Helmholz cites no authority in support of this as-
sertion,13 and, despite occasional loose statements to the effect that "title
by adverse possession is the equivalent of title by prescription,"' 4 most of
the courts that allow "title" to "corporeal" as well as "incorporeal" in-
terests to be established by "prescription" 15 draw a distinction between
adverse possession and prescription. As applied to "corporeal" interests
(L e., possessory estates) "prescription" generally rests on the theory that
long-continued possession of land justifies a presumption that such pos-
session is based on a "lost grant"16 and is therefore rightful. Some cases
(1958), bars ejectment unless the owner brings his action within 10 years, but does not expressly
impose the requirements stated in § 828. Under a separate and distinct doctrine of "prescription,"
possession for 20 years confers title on the adverse claimant even though he fails to satisfy the
requirements stated in § 828. For a discussion of possible anomalous results, see Note, Adverse
Possession in Alabama, 28 ALA. L. REv. 447, 455 (1977).
12. See Adverse Possession. supra note 1 at 335 ("The fundamental distinction, frequently made
by the commentators, between title by prescription and title by adverse possession, simply does not
exist in the case law.").
13. Professor Helmholz cites no case in support of the statement quoted supra note 12, nor is it
supported by any of the cases subsequently cited in Adverse Possession. Professor Helmholz also
states that, in some jurisdictions, there are "prescriptive title statutes, which define the means of
acquiring title by adverse possession" and "typically spell out the five affirmative requirements for
prescriptive title, restating the required length of possession found in the statute of limitations." See
Adverse Possession, supra note I at 334-35, citing Taylor, supra note 11 at 551-54. However, Profes-
sor Taylor's article provides no support for this statement. Apparently Professor Helmholz had in
mind statutes like N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW §§ 511-22, which defines "adverse possession" but
does not purport to "vest title" in the "adverse possessor."
14. See, eg., Fiest v. Steere, 175 Kan. 1, 7, 259 P.2d 140, 144 (1953).
15. See 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.15; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1136; 5 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2540A (1957) [herein-
after cited as G. THOMPSON] for cases from about 20 jurisdictions holding or stating that a "corpo-
real" interest (La, a possessory estate) can be acquired by "prescription." But courts in other
jurisdictions have frequently stated that only "incorporeal" interests such as easements and profits
can be acquired by "prescription." See 2 G. THOMPSON, supra at § 335.
16. See 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.16; 4 H. TIFFANY, § 1136; 5 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 15, at § 2540A. See also Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn. App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769 (1964), stating that
the presumption on which the possessor's "prescriptive title" was based "arises independent of the
statute of limitations." Professor Helmholz cites Hill, see Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 355
n.93, for a different point. Apparently he did not realize that Hill is inconsistent with his statement
that the distinction between "title by prescription and title by adverse possession" simply "does not
exist in the case law." See supra note 12.
Although the presumption of a "lost grant" played an important part in the development of the
doctrine of "prescription" as applied to "incorporeal" interests such as easements and profits, it
seems to have faded into the background in twentieth-century cases dealing with easements and
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treat the presumption as one of law to be applied by the court,17 while
other courts treat it as one of fact to be determined by the jury.18 Exactly
how long the possession must have continued is not well-settled,19 but in
most of the cases in which the claimant succeeded on the basis of a pre-
sumed "lost grant" the period was far in excess of the period required by
the jurisdiction's statute of limitations. 20 In any case, a title established
by "prescription" pursuant to a presumed "lost grant" is one based on a
long-continued possession that is considered to have been rightful, while
a title based on adverse possession is based on an admittedly wrongful
possession for the statutory limitation period. When the character and
duration of the claimant's possession are such as to support a claim of
title by adverse possession, there is no need to rely on the presumption of
profits. See 2 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at §§ 8.44-8.58; 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at §§ 335,
337. Thus the doctrine of "prescription" as applied to easements and profits has become more like
the doctrine of "adverse possession" as applied to possessory estates, and less like the doctrine of
"prescription" as applied to possessory estates.
17. See, eg., United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 270 (1947), in which the Court said,
"The presumption of a lost grant to land has received recognition as an appropriate means to quiet
long possession. It recognizes [the fact] that lapse of time may cure the neglect or failure to secure
the proper muniments of title, even though the lost grant may not have been in fact executed." The
Court cited an earlier case for the rule that the legal presumption of a "lost grant" would arise
"wherever, by possibility, a right may be acquired in any manner known by law." Id. at 271. Accord
Kidd v. Browne, 200 Ala. 299, 76 So. 65 (1917); Reed v. Money, 115 Ark. 1, 170 S.W. 478 (1914);
Dunn v. Eaton, 92 Tenn. 743, 23 S.W. 163 (1893).
18. See, eg., Summer v. Child, 2 Conn. 607 (1818); State v. Dickinson, 129 Mich. 221, 88 N.W.
621 (1901); Rosenbaum v. Bohannon, 204 Miss. 9, 36 So. 2d 798 (1948).
19. The cases do not ordinarily specify the length of the period which will be sufficient to
justify the presumption of a grant. It would appear, however, that insofar as the presump-
tion is regarded as a rule of law, calling for the finding of a grant without regard to the
actual belief of the jury therein, it must be supported by a possession of at least the period
of the statute of limitations... When the presumption, so called, involves merely an infer-
ence of the making of a conveyance from the facts of possession, taken in connection with
other circumstances, it seems that a period of possession less than the limitation period
might properly be considered in aid of the inference.
4 H. TiFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1136. In Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennes-
see, the prescriptive period has been fixed at 20 years, although the maximum statutory limitation
period for acquisition of title by adverse possession is now shorter in Alabama (10 years), South
Carolina (10 years), and Tennessee (7 years). The 20-year prescriptive period is apparently derived
from the Statute of 21 James I ch. 16 (1624), which established a 20-year limitation period for
ejectment actions that was widely adopted in the United States at an early date. For discussion of
the doctrine of "prescriptive title" in Alabama, see supra note 11, at 447 & nn.2, 449 & n. 12, & 453
& n.44 and accompanying text.
20. See, e-g., Kidd v. Browne, 200 Ala. 299, 76 So. 65 (1917) (about 60 years); Reed v. Money,
115 Ark. 1, 170 S.W. 478 (1914) (57 years); Coleman v. Coleman, 17 S.C. 518, 51 S.E. 250 (1905)
(about 33 years); Donegal Township School Dist. v. Crosby, 178 Pa. Super. 30, 112 A.2d 645 (1955)
(55 years); Dunn v. Eaton, 92 Tenn. 743, 235 S.W. 163 (1893) (over 43 years); Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn.
App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769 (1964) (about 60 years).
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a "lost grant". In some cases, however, a claimant who would clearly
fail if he relied on adverse possession may succeed on the basis of a pre-
sumed "lost grant", e.g., when the claim is made against the state or
federal government21 or when the claim is made by a governmental
agency with the power of eminent domain.22
None of the cases Professor Helmholz cites in his article holds that
accrual of a cause of action to the true owner for recovery of possession
of his land is irrelevant in the law of adverse possession. Moreover, Pro-
fessor Helmholz's admission that the statute of limitations will not run
against the owner of a future interest who, by definition, has no present
right to possession undercuts his conclusion that accrual of a cause of
action is irrelevant.23 The statute of limitations will not run against the
owner of a future interest precisely because the latter has no cause of
action for recovery of possession so long as he has no present right of
possession.24
In view of Professor Helmholz's repeated references to persons claim-
ing title by adverse possession as "trespassers, '2 it should be emphasized
that the requisite cause of action is one for recovery of possession rather
than one to recover damages for a single trespass or a series of tres-
21. See, eg., United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947); United States v. Chaves, 159
U.S. 452 (1895); Carter v. Walker, 186 Ala. 140, 65 So. 170 (1914); McCain v. Wilson, 176 Ark.
1205, 5 S.W.2d 338 (1928); Trustees of Schools of Tp. No. 8 v. Lilly, 373 Ill. 431, 26 N.E.2d 489
(1940); Kentucky Block Fuel Co. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 137, 268 S.W. 802 (1925); J.H. Leavenworth
& Son, Inc. v. Hunter, 150 Miss. 245, 116 So. 593 (1928); May v. Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co.,
164 N.C. 252, 80 S.E. 380 (1913); Clary v. Bonnett, 114 S.C. 452, 103 S.E. 779 (1920). Sovereign
immunity generally prevents any statute of limitations from running against the state or federal
government.
22. See Donegal Township School Dist. v. Crosby, 178 Pa. Super. 30, 37, 112 A.2d 645, 648
(1955) ("there is authority for the proposition that where a right of eminent domain exists in a
corporation, it cannot claim by adverse possession," but "the doctrine of presumptive grant" can be
applied if the corporation could have obtained property by purchase or gift).
23. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 336.
24. See 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.8 ("A reversioner or remainderman during the
continuance of a prior life estate is not affected by the statute because his action in ejectment to
recover the property does not arise until the life estate ends, as the life tenant alone can maintain the
action."); P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TrrLEs, § 55 (2d ed. 1970); 2A R. POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY 300 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1981) [hereinafter cited as R. POWELL]; 7 id. at § 1017; 4 H. TIFPANY,
supra note 7, at § 1152; 5 G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at § 1152.
Cases holding that "the tenant in common out of possession should not be barred by his cotenant's
activities, no matter how long continued, until the cotenant in possession disavows the tenancy by an
unequivocal act," Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 336, are also based on the fact that the coten-
ant out of possession has no cause of action against the occupying cotenant unless the latter "ex-
cludes" or "ousts" the former, either actually or constructively.
25. See, eg., Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 334, 335, 338 ("knowing trespass") and passim.
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passes26 or to enjoin a series of trespasses.27 Adverse possession is more
than a mere temporary wrongful interference (or a series of interferences)
with the true owner's exclusive right to possession.
The relevance of a judicial determination that the true owner did have
a cause of action to recover possession of land that he failed to assert
within the statutory limitation period will become clearer when this arti-
cle considers in more detail the relation between each of the "five positive
requirements of adverse possession" and the "accrual of a cause of
action."
B. The Five Positive Requirements of Adverse Possession
1. "Actual Possession"
The reason that an adverse claimant must show that he had "actual"
possession of at least part of the land he claims is that the true owner
26. An action of ejectment or its modem equivalent obviously cannot be maintained unless the
defendant is in possession. A. SEDGWICK & F. WAIT, supra note 8, at § 93. Conversely, an action
to recover damages for trespass or to enjoin the continuation of a series of trespasses cannot be
maintained if the defendant is in possession when the action is brought. In the latter case, the
plaintiff must first establish his right to possession by an ejectment action or its modem equivalent.
See, e.g., Wood v. Michigan Air Line Ry. Co., 90 Mich. 212, 51 N.W. 265 (1892); McMillan v.
Turner, 52 N.C. 435 (1860); Tredwell v. Reddick, 23 N.C. 56 (1840). No cited authority supports a
statement apparently to the contrary in D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as D.
DoBBs]. The statement probably refers to cases in which the defendant has created a "continuing
trespass or nuisance." In such cases, ejectment or its modem equivalent is not an appropriate rem-
edy, and the plaintiff may therefore sue repeatedly in trespass for damages or, if the trespass or
nuisance is "permanent," may recover all damages for past and prospective injury in a single action.
See id. at §§ 4.6, 5.4. At common law, a plaintiff could neither maintain trespass while the defend-
ant was in possession or join a claim in trespass for "mesne profits" with an ejectment action; in-
stead, he was required first to recover possession and then to bring a separate trespass action to
recover the "mesne profits." In most jurisdictions, by statute, the plaintiff either may, or must,
recover the "mesne profits" in the action to recover possession of the land. See J. KOFFLER & A.
REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING § 106 (1969); A. SEDGWICK & F. WAIT, supra note 8, at § 62.
In Texas the modem equivalent of ejectment is called "trespass to try title." TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 22.001, 22.002 (Vernon 1984). This action differs from ejectment because it may be main-
tained on the strength of either a "legal" or an "equitable" title, while "ejectment" requires a "legal"
title. See J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra, at § 107. For the history of the "trespass to try title"
action, see A. SEDGWICK & F. WArr, supra note 8, at §§ 81-91.
27. As a general rule no injunctive relief can be awarded if the defendant is in possession of
plaintiff's land; in that case, ejectment or its modern equivalent is normally the proper and adequate
remedy. But the plaintiff may be able to obtain injunctive relief against repeated trespasses by the
defendant. See D. DOBBS, supra note 26, at § 5.6; A. SEDGwicK & F. WAIT, supra note 8, at § 174.
When ejectment would not be appropriate because a sheriff cannot enforce a judgment for the plain-
tiff (eg., when the defendant constructs a substantial building that encroaches on the plaintiff's
land), a court may grant injunctive relief. See D. DOBBS, supra note 26, at § 5.6. Alternatively, a
court may award full damages for all injury to the plaintiff, past and prospective. See id. at § 5.4.
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would otherwise have no cause of action for recovery of possession. New
York and a number of other states expressly define "actual" possession in
their statutes of limitations. 28 Absent a statutory definition, the concept
of "actual" possession is quite flexible.
Neither actual occupancy, cultivation nor residence is necessary to con-
stitute actual possession of land. Where property is so situated as not to
admit of permanent useful improvements, the continued claim of the party,
evidenced by public acts of ownership such as he would exercise over prop-
erty which he claimed in his own right and would not exercise over prop-
erty which he did not claim, may constitute actual possession.29
In short, one may establish "actual" possession by acting as if he were
the owner of the land.
When an adverse claimant holds the property under "color of title," he
must still prove "actual" possession of some part of the tract described in
the document constituting his "color of title," in which case he will be
deemed to have had "constructive" possession of all of the balance of the
tract not "actually" possessed by the true owner.30 In New York and
several other states, the limitation statutes expressly define "color of ti-
28. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 522 (Consol. 1979), which provides that when there is
no "color of title," the land "is deemed to have been possessed and occupied" only (1) "[w]here it
has been usually cultivated or improved" or (2) "[w]here it has been protected by a substantial
inclosure." This language is derived without modification from the N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1828,
and can be found either verbatim, or, with some modifications, in the limitation acts of California,
Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. The
limitation acts of North Carolina and Wisconsin were originally derived from the N.Y. Revised
Statutes of 1828, but they have been more substantially modified. See Bordwell, Disseisin and Ad-
verse Possession 33 YALE L.J. 141, 149 & nn.178-79 (1923) (This article is in three parts, 33 YALE
L.J. 1, 141 & 285.). The current language of the North Carolina and Wisconsin acts relative to
"color of title" departs much further from the original model than the language of the limitation acts
of the other states listed above.
29. Burns v. Crran, 282 Ill. 476, 480, 118 N.E. 750, 752 (1918). See also Monroe v. Rawlings,
331 Mich. 49, 49 N.W.2d 55 (1951) (holding that actual possession was proved because, although
the adverse claimants never improved, fenced, posted, or lived on the land, or attempted to keep
others off, they made regular seasonal use of the land for hunting and fishing, maintained a small
cabin for their guests, sold pulpwood from the land, sold part of the land to the county road commis-
sion, executed and recorded a number of oil leases, mortgages, and made conveyances of parts of the
lands among themselves). But see McDonald v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(holding that use for grazing animals, cutting timber, or harvesting natural crops, without more,
cannot amount to adverse possession); Murray v. Bousquet, 154 Wash. 42, 280 P. 935 (1929) (same).
Generally, as to what constitutes "actual possession," see R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 7, at § 11.7 at 758-59; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1138.
30. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 7, at § 11.7 at 759-60.
"Obviously the adverse possessor may not claim constructive possession over areas not described in
the colorable instrument. There also must be some limit to how large a parcel may be constructively
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tle," as well as the "actual" possession sufficient to give an adverse claim-
ant the benefit of the "constructive" possession doctrine when he
possesses under "color of title."31 Absent a statutory definition of "color
of title," courts generally define "color of title" as any "document that
appears to give title but, for some reason not apparent on its face, does
possessed; presumably it would have to be reasonable in size [relative] to the area actually pos-
sessed." Id. at 760 (footnotes omitted).
As a general rule, "[m]ere assertions of ownership without taking and holding physical control
over the property for the required period do not establish adverse possession." 3 AM. L. PROP.,
supra note 7, at § 15.3 at 768. However, some statutes provide that a person who, in good faith, has
color of title to vacant land and pays the property taxes on the land, will acquire title thereto at the
end of the statutory limitation period. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 7 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.080 (1961). Although these statutes do not require "adverse possession,"
they do provide for acquisition of title by persons with "color of title" who, in effect, assert their
claim of ownership by payment of taxes on vacant land.
31. See, eg., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 511 (Consol. 1979) ("a written instrument, as
being a conveyance of the premises in question, or... the decree or judgment of a competent court")
& § 512 (first defining possession under "color of title" in the same terms used in § 522 to define
possession without "color of title," and then adding cases where the land, "although not inclosed,
. . . has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber, either for the purposes of husbandry or
for the ordinary use of the occupant"). Similar provisions are to be found in the limitations acts of
many other states. See supra note 28.
Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.580 (1979), defining "color of title" to include "a devise in
any will"; or any deed "made upon the sale of the premises by an executor, administrator, guardian,
or testamentary trustee, or by a sheriff or other proper ministerial officer under the order, judgment,
process, or decree of a court.., of competent jurisdiction within this state, or by a sheriff upon a
mortgage foreclosure sale," or "by an officer of this state or the United States who is authorized to
make deeds upon the sale of lands for taxes assessed and levied within this state." "Color of title,"
when it consists of a deed of the kind described, is the basis for giving the adverse claimant the
benefit of a shorter limitation period (5 or 10 years) instead of the general limitation period of 15
years. It is not clear whether documents not mentioned in the statute may constitute "color of title"
for the purpose of establishing the adverse claimant's "constructive" possession of those parts of the
land described in such a document which he did not actually possess.
In a number of states, a shorter statutory limitation period is provided only when the adverse
claimant holds under "color of title" and, in addition, pays the real estate taxes on the land through-
out that period. But payment of taxes is generally not required in order to give the claimant holding
under "color of title" the benefit of the "constructive" adverse possession doctrine.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-31 (West 1952) provides that 30 years' actual possession of any real
estate under "claim or color of title" shall be "a good and sufficient bar to all prior ... claims
whatever,... and shall vest an absolute right and title in the actual possessor of all such real estate."
The relevant "color of title" is defined as "a proprietary right," based on a grant from the original
New Jersey proprietors, "recorded in the office of the surveyor general . . . or the office of the
secretary of statute." But this section appears to have little current relevance. Except for differences
in the treatment of disabilities that may extend the limitation period, adverse possession for the
required limitation period will produce the same legal result, even though the adverse possessor has
no "color of title," under N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-6 to 7 (West 1952) (20 years), or 2A:14-30 (West
1952) (30 years or, as to "woodlands or uncultivated tracts," 60 years). For a detailed treatment of
the New Jersey limitation acts, see Braue v. Fleck, 23 N.J. 1, 127 A.2d 1 (1956).
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not [do so]. ''32 Thus "color of title" may consist of a void or defective
deed executed by a private person or a public officer, a void will, or a
void court judgment or decree.33
2. "Open and Notorious Possession"
The courts created the requirement that possession be "open and noto-
rious" to safeguard the rights of the true owner against a claim of adverse
possession of which he had no knowledge and which he could not have
discovered through reasonable diligence in looking after his land.3
However, as the definition of "actual" possession in the preceding para-
graph of this article suggests, this requirement probably does no more
than state one of the normal characteristics of actual possession of any
area on the earth's surface. One could hardly imagine an "actual" pos-
session of land that is not "open and notorious," since "a furtive, con-
cealed use of the property at odd times is not the exercise of dominion
and control such as characterizes the use and possession of the average
owner in the enjoyment of his property."35 Thus the requirement proba-
bly has independent significance only when title to an area beneath the
surface of the land is claimed by adverse possession and there are no
visible signs of such possession on the surface of the overlying land.36
3. "Hostile Possession"
Unless it is coupled with an additional "claim of right" requirement,
"hostile" simply means wrongful, and states the obvious requirement
32. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 7, at § 11.7 at 759. For a
fuller discussion, see 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1155.
33. Even a quitclaim deed may constitute "color of title" if it purports to convey the land, but
not if it merely releases whatever interest the grantor may have; and an unrecorded deed may consti-
tute "color of title." But it is frequently held that a document void on its face cannot constitute
"color of title." See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1155; 5 G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at
§ 2550.
34. See H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1140. Contra 3 AM. L. PROP. supra note 7, at § 15.3 at
769 ("implication that there must be notoriety of possession so as to acquaint the owner thereof
before the statute starts to run is quite untenable if possession in fact exists, because the owner has
the right to maintain ejectment against such possessor, and the statute starts to run as soon as the
cause of action accrues.").
35. 3 Am. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.3 at 769. Accord 4 H. TIFFANY, § 1140 at 728 (noting
that cases stating that notoriety of possession is unnecessary if the possession is known to the true
owner "suggest, by implication, that there might be a possession sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of actual possession, but not sufficient to satisfy that of visible and notorious possession.").
36. See, eg., Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E.2d 917 (1937) (possession ofcave
not "open and notorious" and therefore not "adverse").
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that the adverse claimant's possession must create a cause of action in the
true owner for recovery of the possession of his land.37 This means that
the adverse claimant's possession must have been wrongful as against the
true owner at its inception or, if not then wrongful, must have been made
wrongful by the subsequent conduct of the parties. Courts often hold
that certain legal relationships by their nature raise a presumption that
the possessor of land holds "in subordination to" the rights of another-
a presumption that only evidence of an unequivocal denial or repudiation
of the other's rights can rebut.38 Common examples are the possession of
a tenant,39 a trustee or agent,4° a purchaser under an executory con-
37. Despite the mental image it conjures up, the term "hostile," as it is generally used in the law
of adverse possession, does not mean that the adverse claimant must act in "bad faith"; "[i]t is not
necessary that he intend to take away from the owner something which he knows to belong to
another, or even that he be indifferent concerning the legal title." 7 R. POWELL, supra note 24, at
101312][c]. However, when a landowner wrongfully occupies a strip of his neighbor's land, a minor-
ity of the courts holds that his possession is not "hostile" if it results from an honest mistake as to
the location of his boundary, rather than from a dishonest intent to appropriate his neighbor's land
or indifference as to the true ownership of the strip. On the other hand, the term "hostile" obviously
does not mean that the adverse claimant must have acted in "good faith," believing that he owned
the land in question. The term is neutral with regard to the adverse claimant's bona fides.
38. 3 AM. L. PROP. supra note 7, § 15.4 at 773.
39. A tenant for years or from period to period is rightfully in possession and he cannot make
his possession "hostile" (wrongful) without repudiating the landlord-tenant relationship on which
his right to possession rests. Most of the adverse possession cases involve possession with the infor-
mal permission of the true owner. See, ag., United Hebrew Congregation v. Bolser, 244 Ky. 102, 50
S.W.2d 45 (1932) (adverse claimant permitted to have possession in return for a "small rental");
Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 199 A.2d 209 (1964) (adverse claimant in possession under
unenforceable oral purchase contract); Martin v. Randona, 175 Mont. 321, 323, 573 P.2d 1156, 1158
(1978) (adverse claimants "were on the land ... with the permission of" the true owners.). In all
such cases the adverse claimant is a tenant at will, rightfully in possession unless and until the
tenancy is terminated in some manner, including repudiation by either party.
In cases in which the true owner's attempt to transfer a fee simple estate is legally ineffective
because of some defect in execution of the deed or because no written conveyance was executed, it
can be argued that the intended grantee is only a tenant at will when he takes possession. But the
prevailing view is that he is an adverse possessor because he holds under a "claim of right" inconsis-
tent with the grantor's title-a "claim of right" recognized and acquiesced in by the grantor, who
intended to transfer his entire estate to the adverse claimant. See 2 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at
§ 15.6 n.2. See, eg., Vandiveer v. Stickney, 75 Ala. 225 (1883); Nevells v. Carter, 122 Me. 81, 119
A. 62 (1922) (intended grantee was adverse possessor although true owner continued in actual pos-
session, because the latter became the tenant of the former).
In some cases it is proper to infer the true owner's permission for the adverse claimant's posses-
sion, eg., when it is customary for landowners to allow others to make limited use of vacant, unim-
proved land, subject to a tacit understanding that such use is not "hostile" (wrongful) as against the
owner. Many of the cases stating that a "mere squatter" cannot acquire title by adverse possession
can be explained either on this ground, see, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Devine, 53 Wash. 241, 101 P.
841 (1909), or on the ground that the limited use by the "squatter" did not amount to possession.
40. See, eg., Meacham v. Bunting, 156 I1. 586, 41 N.E. 175 (1895) (trustee); Terry v. Daven-
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tract,4 1 a mortgagor or mortgagee,4 2 an occupying co-tenant who has not
"excluded" or "ousted" his or her non-occupying co-tenants, 43 and a
grantor after delivery of a deed to his grantee.' However, except per-
haps for the last relationship, it is clear that the possessor is rightfully in
possession and that the other party has no cause of action for recovery of
possession. Thus, it is not really necessary to invoke any "presumption"
port, 185 Ind. 561, 112 N.E. 998 (1916) (same); Leigh v. Howard, 87 N.J.L. 113, 93 A. 680 (Sup. Ct.
1915) (president of corporation termed a "trustee"). Presumably other fiduciary relationships will
have the same effect.
41. See, e.g., Patterson v. Johnson, 225 Ala. 401, 143 So. 560 (1932); Johnson v. Hume, 163 Ga.
867, 137 S.E. 56 (1927) (per curiam); Rains v. Louisville & N. R.R., 254 Ky. 794, 72 S.W.2d 482
(1934); Hogan v. Egyptian Portland Cement Co., 257 Mich. 381, 241 N.W. 129 (1932). Assuming
that the contract is enforceable, the purchaser is said to be an equitable owner in possession, but is
actually some kind of tenant because his right to possession lasts only so long as he continues his
performance of the contract.
42. See, eg., Warder v. Enslen, 73 Cal. 291, 14 P. 874 (1887) (mortgagee's possession not ad-
verse prior to refusal of mortgagor's offer to redeem); Holmes v. Turner's Falls Co., 150 Mass. 535,
23 N.E. 305 (1890) (mortgagors possession not adverse to mortgagee). After the mortgagor's de-
fault (but rarely before default), the mortgagee may obtain possession of the land with the mortga-
gor's consent, or peaceably although without the mortgagors consent. In either case, the
mortgagee's possession is rightful and he holds as a quasi-trustee subject to a duty to account for all
rents and profits obtained while he is in possession and to maintain the mortgaged property. This is
true under the "lien" as well as under the "title" and "hybrid" theories of the mortgage. See G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.27-.28, 4.30-.33 (2d ed. 1985).
43. See, ag., Johnson v. James, 237 Ark. 900, 903, 377 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1964) (possession ofless
than all "is presumed to be possession by all cotenants"); Spangler v. Schaus, 106 R.I. 795, 264 A.2d
161 (1970) (same-cotenants of an easement); Holbrook v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 288, 431 P.2d 123
(1967) (same). See also Dunlop v. Twin Beach Park Ass'n, 111 Mich. App. 261, 314 N.W.2d 578
(1981). Cotenants have an "equal" and "concurrent" right to possession, but the failure of one or
more cotenants to exercise this right does not make the possession of other cotenants tortious.
Professor Helmholz's argument that "more cases found in the reports of the years surveyed have
held in favor of the acquisition of title by an adversely possessing cotenant than is consistent with the
conclusiveness of the rule" that his possession is not "adverse" unless he has "ousted" or "excluded"
the other cotenants, see Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 354, is examined infra in the text accom-
panying notes 205-29.
44. In such cases, a strong presumption exists that the grantor's possession is subordinate to the
grantee's title. See, e.g., Daniel v. Williams, 177 Ala. 140, 58 So. 419 (1912); Lay v. Whelchel, 78
Ga. 786, 3 S.E. 906 (1887); Rowe v. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154 (1868); Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Homan, 151
Iowa 404, 131 N.W. 878 (1911); Sellers v. Crossan, 52 Kan. 570, 35 P. 205 (1894); Nugent v.
Peterman, 137 Mich. 646, 100 N.W. 895 (1904); Jackson v. Burton, 1 Wend. 341 (N.Y. 1928);
Gardner v. Wright, 59 Or. 609, 91 P. 286 (1907); Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa. 132, 58 A. 152 (1904).
It is sometimes said that this presumption is based on the grantee's tacit permission for the grantor
to remain in possession until the grantee is ready to take possession, but it is probably based mainly
on the strong policy against allowing the grantor to "derogate from his grant" by asserting an ad-
verse claim against his own grantee. Cases holding that the passage of time may overcome the
presumption are consistent with the tacit permission theory; but cases like Jackson v. Burton, 1
Wend. 341 (N.Y. 1928), holding that a grantor's possession was not "adverse" although continued
for 27 years, are obviously based on the policy stated above.
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that the possessor holds "in subordination to" the title of the other
party.45
4. "Exclusive Possession"
The requirement that the adverse claimant's possession be "exclusive"
merely states a necessary factual basis for concluding that the adverse
claimant's possession was wrongful ("hostile") as against the true owner.
This requirement does not mean that the adverse claimant must in all
cases have been in sole possession of the land, only that he must not have
shared possession with the owner.46
5. "Continuous Possession"
The "continuous" possession requirement simply assures that the true
owner has had a cause of action to recover possession of his land for the
full statutory period of limitation.47 This requirement has meaning only
if the time of accrual of the true owner's cause of action can be fixed.
45. At least 10 states have a statutory presumption that any person other than the true owner
holds "in subordination to" the title of the true owner. These states are California, Florida, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. See, eg.,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 321 (Deering 1972), which provides as follows:
[I]n every action for the recovery of real property ... the person establishing a legal title
to the property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law,
and the occupation of the property by any other person is deemed to have been under and
in subordination to the legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and
possessed adversely to such legal title, for five years before the commencement of the
action.
This and similar provisions in the other states can be traced to the New York Revised Statutes of
1828. See infra notes 50-51. See also supra note 28.
46. That adverse possession must be "exclusive" means that it must not be shared with the
disseised owner. Two or more persons may be coadverse possessors; if they acquire title, it
will be as tenants in common. One may be in adverse possession through another whom he
has put in possession as a tenant.... Of course an adverse possessor may be in exclusive
possession of part of a parcel of land and the owner in possession of another part; that is
equally so in mistaken boundary cases.
R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 11.7, at 762-63. Accord 7 R.
POWELL, supra note 24, at 1013[2][d]; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1141. Broad statements that
the adverse claimant's possession must be "exclusive of all others" are clearly wrong because, as
indicated above, there may be several concurrent adverse possessors. However, if two or more per-
sons acting independently rather than concurrently seek to establish possession of the same land at
the same time, their conduct should be viewed as a series of trespasses rather than as establishing
"possession."
47. "Continuity" of possession may be preserved when one adverse possessor transfers posses-
sion to another adverse possessor inter vivos or there is a transfer pursuant to a testamentary disposi-
tion or by inheritance. In such cases, "privity" is said to exist between the successive adverse
possessors, and their successive periods of possession may be "tacked" (added) together to satisfy the
time required by the applicable statute of limitations. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
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Abandonment of possession by the adverse claimant or his ouster by the
true owner or by some third party prior to expiration of the statutory
limitation period will necessarily terminate the true owner's cause of ac-
tion to recover possession. Any subsequent repossession of the land by
the adverse claimant will create a new cause of action in the true owner
and cause a new limitation period to begin to run.4"
II. "SUBJECTIVE INTENT" AND "CLAIM OF RIGHT"
In addition to requiring that the adverse claimant's possession must be
"hostile", many courts also require that the possession be under a "claim
of title" or "claim of right." This requirement originated in a series of
early nineteenth-century New York cases which held that the possession
of any person other than the true owner of land was presumed to be "in
subordination to" the title of the true owner, and that this presumption
could be overcome only by proof that the adverse claimant was asserting
a "claim of title" or "claim of right" inconsistent with the true owner's
title.49 The New York Revised Statutes of 1828 incorporated the "claim
of title" requirement5" whence it passed into the statutory law of at least
ten other states.51 "But more important than the influence of the New
WHrrMAN, supra note 7, § 11.7 at 763-64; 3 Am. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.10; 4 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 7, at § 1146.
48. See 3 Am. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.9; 7 R. POWELL, supra note 24, at 1013[2][e]; 5
G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at § 2551; 4 H. TiFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1145.
49. For a discussion of the New York cases, see Bordwell, supra note 28, at 148-49. Various
courts have used the terms "claim of title," "claim of right," and "claim of ownership" to express
the same requirement. The early New York cases generally used the term "claim of title."
50. See Bordwell, supra note 28, at 149 nn.177 & 178. The New York Revised Statutes of 1828
provisions as to adverse possession employed the term "claim of title," as have all subsequent New
York statutory revisions including the current one. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 511, 521
(Consol. 1979) ("claim of title"). See also id. at §§ 512, 522 ("a person claiming title"). Sections 511
and 512 define adverse possession when the claimant has both "color of title" and "claim of title".
Sections 521 and 522 define adverse possession when the claimant has only "claim of title." The
Revised Statutes of 1828 apparently codified the presumption of "subordinate" holding, but it is
omitted in the current New York limitation act.
51. See Bordwell, supra note 28, at 149 n.17 (listing California, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Ne-
vada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin). The limitation acts of
all these states incorporate both the presumption of "subordinate" holding and the "claim of title"
requirement. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 321 (Deering 1972) gives the legal titleholder the benefit of
the presumption "unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title, for five years before the commencement of the action". Sections 322 and 324 provide that
land "is deemed to have been held adversely" when possession was begun and has continued for the
5-year limitation period "under claim of title, exclusive of [any] other right". Sections 323 and 325,
respectively, define "adverse" possession when the adverse claimant does, or does not, have "color of
title."
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York cases on the statutory law has been their influence on the law of the
courts, for the early New York cases "were cited everywhere and were
recognized as having the greatest authority."52
Although a few American courts rejected the "claim of right" require-
ment for adverse possession,5 3 the great majority adopted the require-
ment,54 together with the associated presumption of "subordination."55
But that presumption is, in fact, merely a way of stating that the ultimate
burden of proving that title has been acquired by adverse possession rests
on the adverse claimant.56 Once the adverse claimant has introduced
evidence of his actual wrongful possession for the statutory limitation
period, the burden of producing evidence to rebut the adverse claimant's
case shifts to the holder of the paper title.57 And the "claim of right"
requirement, although it may cause trouble in certain special situations,5
has little practical significance in ordinary adverse possession cases. The
52. Bordwell, supra note 28, at 149. This article will hereinafter use the term "claim of right"
because that is the term Professor Helmholz used in Adverse Possession, supra note 1. The rationale
of the "claim of right" requirement is not clear. The assertion that "adverse possession" was the
equivalent of "disseisin," and that "disseisin" required a "claim of right," is clearly inaccurate. See
Bordwell, supra note 28, at 141, citing COKE, LITTLETON, *181a; Bracton, fol. 161 b; ROLLE,
ABRIDGEMENT 659; 2 PRESTON, ABSTRACTS OF TITLE 292 (2d ed. 1824). Accord 4 H. TIFFANY,
supra note 7, § 1147.
53. See Bryan v. Atwater, 5 Day 181 (Conn. 1811). The Supreme Court of Connecticut stated:
To make a disseisin, it is not necessary that the disseizor should claim title to the lands
taken by him. It is not necessary that he should deny or disclaim the title of the legal
proprietor. No; it is necessary only that he should enter into, and take possession of, the
lands, as if they were his own.
Id. at 188.
54. See 2 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 15.4; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1147; A.
SEDGWICK & F. WAIT, supra note 8, at §§ 754-56.
55. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1144 nn.8-9; 2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 269 nn.16-
17, § 270 n.37.
56. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1144 nn.4-7.
The adverse claimant may be the defendant in an action to recover possession by the holder of the
paper title, in which case the plaintiff must "recover upon the strength of his own title." But in such
cases the plaintiff satisfies his initial burden of producing evidence by showing his paper title, and
both the burden of introducing evidence that the plaintiff's title was extinguished by adverse posses-
sion for the statutory limitation period and the burden of persuading the trier of fact on this point
shift to the defendant.
In many cases, however, the plaintiff in an action to quiet title or to recover possession of land
may rely on acquisition of title by adverse possession to establish his right to judicial relief. In such
cases, the plaintiff has the burden of both producing evidence in support of his claim, and persuading
the trier of fact that his claim is valid.
See 7 R. POWELL, supra note 24, at 1018.
57. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 144 nn.ll-120.
58. The "claim of right" requirement has been most troublesome in cases in which the adverse
claimant claims to own an estate less than a fee simple, derived either from the true owner or from
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courts agree (1) that "claim of right" means only a manifested "intention
to appropriate and hold the land as owner, to the exclusion, rightfully or
wrongfully, of every one else;" 9 (2) that this intention need not be mani-
fested by any express oral declaration but "may be generally evidenced
by the character of his [the adverse claimant's] possession and acts of
ownership; '6 and (3) that if these acts are "sufficiently definite, open and
exclusive, it will be presumed that they are done with the intent to appro-
priate the land."' 61 Thus those "acts of ownership" required to establish
the adverse claimant's "actual, open, notorious, hostile, and exclusive"
possession of the land will also be sufficient to create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the adverse claimant has a "claim of right. '62
Even if the adverse claimant's possession at its inception is such as to
someone else, and in the "mistaken boundary" cases discussed in part III of this article. See infra
notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
59. A. SEDGWICK & F. WArr, supra note 8, at § 756. This statement appears verbatim (with or
without quotation marks) or in substance in many judicial opinions. See, e.g., Higginbotham v.
Kuehn, 102 Ariz. 37, 38, 424 P.2d 165, 166 (1967); McCurdy v. Rich, 76 Ind. App. 469, 471, 132
N.E. 315, 316 (1921); Fear v. Barwise, 9 Kan. 131, 136, 143 P. 505, 507 (1914); Bond v. O'Gara, 177
Mass. 139, 143-44, 58 N.E. 275, 276 (1900); Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 11, 77 N.W. 424, 424
(1898); Morrison v. Linn, 50 Mont. 396, 402, 147 P. 166, 168 (1915); Weiss v. Meyer, 208 Neb. 429,
432, 303 N.W.2d 765, 768 (1981); Caywood v. January, 455 P.2d 49, 50 (Old. 1969); Bessler v.
Powder River Gold Dredging Co., 95 Ore. 271, 279, 185 P. 753, 756 (1919); Houston Oil Co. v.
Brown, 202 S.W. 102, 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 659 (1919). It should be
noted that in most of these cases the court expressly said that the "claim of right" need not be
asserted in "good faith."
60. A. SEDGWICK & F. WAn , supra note 8, at § 758.
Conceding the necessity of a showing by the person in possession of a claim of right or title
on his part, such claim may no doubt be shown by evidence of declarations by the posses-
sor, or by those of the persons through whom he claims title, but ordinarily.., it is to be
inferred from the fact that the possessor's entry was under color of title, or from the doing
of acts by the possessor during his possession such as ordinarily only an owner would do,
such as the construction of buildings and making of improvements, fencing and use of
fenced lands, the payment of taxes.
4 H. TiEPANY, supra note 7, at § 1148 (citing numerous cases).
See also Hauer v. Van Straaten Chem. Co., 415 Ill. 268, 273, 112 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1953) ("It is
enough that the claimant prove he so acted that it showed he claimed title. Using and controlling
property as an owner is the ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title, and it is the only way a claim
of title could be proved in many cases.").
61. A SEDOWICK & F. WArr, supra note 8, at 758. See also 2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 270
at nn.41-43; id. § 271 at nn.52-60. To the same effect, though not cited in C.J.S., is Zuanich v.
Quero, 135 Vt. 322, 325, 376 A.2d 763, 765 (1977) ("Absent evidence of permission, open and
notorious use for the statutorily prescribed period of time gives rise to a prima facie claim of right.").
62. See 3 AM. L. PROP. supra note 7, § 15.4 at 776-78; 4 H. TiFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1148
text accompanying n.8. In many cases, the courts treat the evidence as to the adverse claimant's
"acts of ownership" as establishing both that he acquired "actual" possession of the land, and that
his possession was "adverse." See, eg., Monroe v. Rawlings, 331 Mich. 49, 49 N.W.2d 55 (1951).
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create a presumption that the adverse claimant has a "claim of right,"
the presumption can be rebutted by proof that the adverse claimant later
became the true owner's tenant 63 or contracted to buy the land from the
true owner" before the expiration of the statutory limitation period. In
either case, the adverse claimant's possession would become "permis-
sive" rather than "adverse" and the true owner's cause of action against
the adverse claimant would terminate. Proof that the adverse claimant
in some manner indicated to the true owner that his possession was not
under any "claim of right" would also rebut the presumption arising
from the adverse claimant's original "owner-like" conduct in taking and
holding possession. The adverse claimant, for example, might have
(1) made an offer to lease the land6" or to purchase it66 from the true
63. See, eg., Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1969) (adverse claimant
paid $200 as rent); Abbey Homestead Ass'n v. Willard, 48 Cal. 614 (1874); Chicago & Alton R.R. v.
Keegan, 185 Ill. 70, 56 N.E. 1088 (1900); Frazier v. Banks, 294 Ky. 61, 170 S.W.2d 900 (1943);
Woods v. Garrard, 282 Ky. 233, 138 S.W.2d 325 (1940); Houghton County v. Massie, 215 Mich.
654, 184 N.W. 446 (1921); Campau v. Lafferty, 50 Mich. 114, 15 N.W. 40 (1883); Campau v. Laf-
ferty, 43 Mich. 429, 5 N.W. 648 (1880); Olson v. Burk, 94 Minn. 456, 103 N.W. 335 (1905); North-
ern Pac. Ry. v. George, 51 Wash. 303, 98 P. 1126 (1908). A formal lease made the adverse
claimant's possession rightful in all the cited cases except Ayers. In Ayers there was no lease and the
adverse claimant became a tenant at will. No doubt the true owner, on discovering someone wrong-
fully in possession of his land, normally insists on execution of a formal lease if he decides not to
evict the wrongful possessor.
Acceptance of a deed from the true owner conveying a life estate to him would seem to make the
adverse claimant's possession rightful because his subsequent possession would be consistent with his
rights as life tenant.
If the true owner makes a legally effective conveyance of a fee simple estate to the adverse claim-
ant, the full ownership of the land is transferred and the adverse claimant's possession thereafter is
rightful as against the world. If the intended conveyance is not legally effective because of some
defect in the deed, or because no written instrument was executed, the prevailing view is that the
intended grantee is an adverse possessor rather than a tenant at will. See supra note 39.
64. Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 199 A.2d 209 (1964) (adverse claimants were in
possession under an unenforceable oral contract with true owner, and made repeated requests for a
deed conveying legal title to them); Central Pac. Ry. v. Torpey, 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554 (1917)
(adverse claimant sought to obtain specific performance of contract).
A purchaser in possession under an unenforceable contract is, for most purposes, both an "equita-
ble" owner and a tenant with the right to remain in possession so long as he does not default in
performance of the purchase contract; thus he would appear to be a tenant at will.
65. See, eg., Risher v. Madsen, 94 Neb. 72, 142 N.W. 700 (1913); Horton v. Davidson, 135 Pa.
186, 19 A. 934 (1890). Tiffany states that "[a] mere offer to take a lease would seem also to be strong
evidence of recognition of the other's title, even if not conclusive in that regard." 4 H. TiFFANY,
supra note 7, at §§ 1166.
66. Davis v. Mayweather, 255 Ark. 966, 504 S.W.2d 741 (1974); Central Pac. R.R. v. Mead, 63
Cal. 112 (1883); Lovell v. Frost, 44 Cal. 471 (1872); Calkins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150, 237 P.2d
1053 (1951); Montgomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150 (1931); Litchfield v. Sewell,
97 Iowa 247, 66 N.W. 104 (1896); Munroe v. Pere Marquette Ry., 226 Mich. 158, 197 N.W. 566
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owner; or (2) brought an action to condemn the land;67 or (3) acknowl-
edged the superior title of the true owner in some other way, by either a
direct statement to him or a statement to a third party who later commu-
nicated it to the true owner. 68
(1924); Dunlop v. Twin Beach Park Ass'n, Ill Mich. App. 261, 314 N.W.2d 578 (1981); Taranto v.
People's Bank of Biloxi, 242 Miss. 607, 136 So. 2d 213 (1962); Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 624
P.2d 522 (1981); Beaver v. Davis, 275 Or. 209, 550 P.2d 428 (1976); Truman v. Raybuck, 207 Pa.
357, 56 A. 944 (1904); Headerick v. Fritts, 93 Tenn. 270,24 S.W. 11 (1893); Bitonti v. Kauffeld Co.,
94 W. Va. 752, 120 S.E. 908 (1923); State v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 19 P.2d 955 (1933).
In most of these cases the courts were careful to point out that the presumption can be overcome
only by an "offer to purchase... the property, and not merely to purchase an outstanding or adverse
claim or title to quiet his possession or protect himself from litigation." Lovell v. Frost, 44 Cal. at
474. Some of these cases hold as well as say that the latter does not amount to a disclaimer, e.g.,
Baley v. Bond, 237 Ala. 59, 185 So. 411 (1938); Headerick v. Fritts, 93 Tenn. 270,24 S.W. 11 (1893);
Bitonti v. Kauffeld, 94 W.Va. 752, 120 S.E. 908 (1923); Glithero v. Fenner, 122 Wis. 356, 99 N.W.
1027 (1904).
In the cases cited above, the courts seem to have thought that a real "offer to purchase the prop-
erty" amounts to a "disclaimer" of any "claim of right" as a matter of law. But cf Montgomery
County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150 (1931) (offer of $200 is only some evidence of a dis-
claimer, but is not conclusive); Walbrunn v. Ballen, 68 Mo. 164 (1878) (offer to buy is only evidence
of disclaimer to be considered by the jury).
67. Nebraska Ry. v. Culver, 35 Neb. 143, 52 N.W. 886 (1892).
68. See, eg., Gurganus v. Kiker, 286 Ala. 442, 241 So. 2d 113 (1970) (adverse claimant agreed
to "have an abstract run" and that the party shown by the abstract to have the "better paper title"
should be recognized as the true owner); Vittitow v. Burnett, 112 Ark. 277, 165 S.W. 625 (1914);
Tidwell v. Waldrup, 347 Mo. 1028, 151 S.W.2d 1092 (1941); Weisel v. Hobbs, 138 Neb. 656, 294
N.W. 448 (1940); Tindle v. Linville, 512 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1973); Robinson v. Leverenz, 185 Or. 262,
202 P.2d 517 (1949); Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Wilson, 10 Watts 261 (Pa. 1840); Ingersoll v.
Lewis, 11 Pa. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536 (1849); Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684 (1846);
Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1970).
In Gurganus v. Kiker, there is an apparent alternative holding based on the plaintiff's testimony
that defendant was not in possession during the 5 years before the ejectment action was begun. The
court said that the 10-year statute of limitations "does not apply unless defendant was in adverse
possession during the whole of the ten-year period next preceding the commencement of the action,"
despite the fact that "the statutory period of ten years" had seemingly expired some 10 years before
the action was begun. 286 Ala. at 448-49, 241 So. 2d at 119. This novel doctrine would obviously
require an adverse possessor either to "keep his flag" flying forever or to bring a suit to quiet title
promptly upon expiration of the statutory period. But it seems probable that the date "which ended
the statutory period of ten years" after the adverse possession began, was February 21, 1967 and not
February 21, 1957 as the court stated. Id. at 444, 241 So. 2d at 115. If so, the ejectment action was
begun shortly after the 10-year period following the inception of the defendant's adverse possession
expired, and defendant's failure to prove more than 5 years of actual adverse possession after its
inception would require the court's holding that he had failed to prove title by adverse possession.
In Bank v. Wilson, the court said that the acknowledgment of the true owner's title must not only
be "express," but also must be joined with "a distinct agreement to leave the land or continue as
tenant." 10 Watts at 262. In Patterson v. Reigle and Ingersoll v. Lewis, however, the Pennsylvania
court did not insist on this additional requirement; and in Ingersoll, the acknowledgement was not
really "express," though it was inferable from a phrase in a written contract by which the adverse
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Many of the judicial opinions holding that an adverse claimant's
wrongful possession for the statutory period did not extinguish the true
owner's title because the claimant's later conduct overcame the usual
presumption that he had a "claim of right" contain no satisfactory ra-
tionale. Indeed, some of the opinions are both confused and confusing.69
In one case, for example, the court said that, absent a "claim of right,"
the adverse claimant's "occupancy" was "subservient to the paramount
title" rather than "adverse" to it, and that there was therefore "nothing
more than a mere trespass" which, "no matter how long continued, can
never ripen into good title."' 70 But this statement is nonsensical. If "sub-
servient to the paramount title" means that the possession was "permis-
sive," the possession was rightful and could not even amount to a
"trespass." On the other hand, if "occupancy" means "possession," "oc-
cupancy" would amount to more than a mere "trespass." But if there
was really nothing more than a "trespass" not amounting to "posses-
sion," the true owner had a cause of action for damages rather than for
recovery of possession, in which case the presence or absence of a "claim
of right" is quite irrelevant.71
As some courts have recognized, the best explanation of the results in
most of the "disclaimer" cases is that "the possessor estops himself from
asserting the statute by assertions brought home to the owner directly or
indirectly that he occupies in recognition of the owner's title, and this
induces him [the owner] not to take action to recover the property. '72
Concededly, however, this estoppel theory fails to explain the occasional
judicial statement that recognition of the true owner's superior right,
possessor agreed to buy land other than the land he adversely possessed. 11 Pa. at 220, 51 Am. Dec.
at 544.
Other courts have held that the acknowledgement or admission of the true owner's title may be
inferred from conduct other than an express statement. See, eg., McCoy v. Kentucky & W. Va. Gas
Co., 312 Ky. 57, 226 S.W.2d 515 (1950) (negotiation of mineral lease to third party by adverse
claimant on behalf of record owner, to whom royalties were to be paid).
Cf. McAllister v. Hartzell, 60 Ohio St. 69, 5 N.E. 715 (1899) (admission, in true owner's presence,
that adverse claimant did not own the land was not sufficient to suspend the running of the statutory
limitation period).
69. This is especially true of the opinions of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which form a
disproportionately large portion of the cases Professor Helmholz surveyed.
70. Hensz v. Linnstaedt, 501 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 26 & 27.
72. 3 AM. L. PROP. supra note 7, § 15.4, at 775 & § 15.9, at 811. The early Pennsylvania
adverse possession cases clearly adopted the estoppel theory. See Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v.
Wilson, 10 Watts 261 (Pa. 1840); Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Pa. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536 (1849); and
Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684 (1846).
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even after the adverse claimant has been in possession for a period in
excess of the statutory limitation period, will be admissible in evidence to
show that his possession was not under "claim of right,"73 or the occa-
sional intimation that a "disclaimer" not shown to have been brought
home to the true owner may nevertheless preclude the adverse claimant's
acquisition of title.74 Such statements indicate that a few courts take se-
riously the notion that an adverse claimant must have a subjective "claim
of right," although they do not explain how lack of such a "claim of
right" can make the adverse claimant's possession rightful so that the
statutory limitation period will not run against the true owner.
73. See Sanders v. Baker, 217 Ark. 521, 624-25, 231 S.W.2d 106, 108 (1950); Bruni v. Vidaurri,
140 Tex. 138, 150, 166 S.W.2d 81, 92 (1942); McDonald v. Batson, 501 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973). See also Hensz v. Linnstaedt, 501 S.W.2d at 465 (adverse claimant, in deposition made
while quiet title action was pending, "admitted that there was no appropriation of the land com-
menced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of the true
owner" until about one year before the action was begun; this precluded acquisition of title by ad-
verse possession as a matter of law).
Judicial assertions that statements made by the adverse claimant after he has been in possession
for the statutory limitation period are admissible to show he did not hold under "claim of title"
during the alleged period of adverse possession, are often coupled with the statement that "where
title by limitation has become vested in the adverse claimant, a mere recognition of some other title
does not revest the title acquired by adverse possession." Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444, 446, 97
S.W. 444, 445 (1906). Accord Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. 1970). It is not clear
whether the phrase "some other title" refers to the title the former true owner held.
74. See Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 254 Ark. 1002, 1003, 498 S.W.2d 2, 3 (1973). See
also Dillaha v. Temple, 590 S.W.2d 331 (Ark. App. 1973). The Arkansas court stated "there was
testimony at trial which indicated that" the adverse claimant "had once told his son that he recog-
nized some interest of' the true owner "in the disputed property." Id. at 332. But the court did not
make clear the significance of this "disclaimer." Later in the opinion, the court stated that the
adverse claimant "in telephone conversation" with the true owner "had reaffirmed that they would
work out their boundary line," which "evidence again indicate[d] a lack of hostile intent." Id. at 333.
This statement to the true owner might well provide an adequate basis to estop the adverse claimant
from subsequently asserting that his possession was "hostile."
In Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684 (1846), the court said, "It has been determined
that one already in possession estops himself by declarations of submission addressed to the owner,
and it would seem that he might do so by a general declaration explanatory of the nature of his
entry." Id at 204, 45 Am. Dec. at 685. It is not clear what the court meant by the second clause in
the quoted sentence. There was no evidence in Patterson that the adverse claimant's "general decla-
rations," to the effect that they "totally disclaimed holding any interest in the land whatever" and
had only settled the land "to buy it, or get pay for the improvements" if the true owner should ever
appear, were brought to the attention of the true owner, whose identity was not known to the ad-
verse claimants. Id. at 202, 45 Am. Dec. at 683. Perhaps the court assumed that such general
declarations would be brought home to the true owner in some way. In any event, the court held
that the possession of the adverse claimants was to be presumed "adverse" and under "claim of
right" in the absence of an express declaration that "they meant not to acquire title... for them-
selves" under the statute of limitation. Id. at 204, 45 Am. Dec. at 685 (emphasis added).
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III. THE RELEVANCE OF AN ADVERSE CLAIMANT'S GOOD FAITH
OR BAD FAITH
Regardless of the operational significance of the "claim of right" re-
quirement in adverse possession cases, the older cases are practically
unanimous in holding that the "claim of right" is equally efficacious
whether it is asserted in "good faith" or "bad faith."" Professor Helm-
holz concedes that the recent cases he surveyed, "taken as a whole, do
not show that the adverse claimant must plead and prove that he acted in
good faith,"76 but he asserts that "[t]he cases do clearly show that the
trespasser [sic] who knows that he is trespassing stands lower in the eyes
of the law, and is less likely to acquire title by adverse possession than the
trespasser who acts in an honest belief that he is simply occupying what
is his already."" This article will therefore undertake an analysis of the
cases cited by Professor Helmholz in support of his conclusion as to the
legal significance of an adverse claimant's "good faith" or "bad faith."
A. Possession Under Color of Title
"Honest possession" is obviously relevant-indeed, essential-when
75. "Good faith" was required in Livingston v. Peru Iron Co., 9 Wend. 511 (N.Y. 1832), but
the "good faith" requirement was definitely repudiated in Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend.
587, 610 (N.Y. 1840). Cases in accord with Humbert include, eg., Smith v. Roberts, 62 Ala. 83
(1878); May v. Dobbins, 166 Ind. 331, 77 N.E. 353 (1906); Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280, 31
N.E. 300 (1892); Smith v. Feneley, 240 Mich. 439, 215 N.W. 353 (1927); Foulke v. Bond, 41 N.J.L.
527 (Err. & App. 1879); Patterson v. Reigle, 4 Pa. 201, 45 Am. Dec. 684 (1846); Lattie-Morrison v.
Holladay, 27 Or. 175, 39 P. 1100 (1895); Jones v. Lemon, 26 W. Va. 629 (1885); Ovig v. Morrison,
142 Wis. 243, 125 N.W. 449 (1910). The classic statement is that an adverse claimant, "entering to
gain a title though, conscious that he is a wrongdoer, will accomplish his object if, the owner do [sic]
not enter or prosecute his claim within the prescribe period." Patterson, 4 Pa. at 204, 45 Am. Dec. at
685. See also Smith v. Roberts, 62 Ala. at 86 ("Adverse possession, open, notorious, accompanied
with acts of ownership, or claim of ownership, bars an action for the recovery of lands, without any
reference to the bonafides, or color of title, under which the adverse holder claims ownership. It is
the actual claim of ownership, not the bona fides which is the test.").
Contra Goulding v. Shonquist, 159 Iowa 647, 141 N.W. 24 (1913); Ramsey v. Wilson, 52 Wash.
111, 100 P. 177 (1909) (seemingly holding that "good faith" is required for possession to ripen into
title under the 10-year limitation act, which does not require "color of title"). But Ramsey appears
to have been overruled sub silentio by State v. Stockdale, 34 Wash. 2d 857, 210 P.2d 686 (1949), and
Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wash. 2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944). In both Stockdale and Ho-
gan, the court actually held that "bad faith" claimants had acquired title by adverse possession. For
a discussion of the Washington cases, see Stoebuck, The Law ofAdverse Possession in Washington, 35
WASH. L. REv. 53, 83-84 (1960). Subsequent Washington cases have continued to state the "good
faith" requirement, but none of them involved any issue as to "good faith" or "bad faith."
76. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 332.
77. Id.
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an adverse claimant holds under "color of title" and either seeks the ben-
efit of a shorter limitation period or the benefit of constructive possession
beyond the bounds of his actual possession7 under a "color of title" limi-
tation statute, that expressly imposes a "good faith" requirement.79
Under these statutes, if the adverse claimant knows that the document of
title upon which he relies as constituting his "color of title" is a nullity
when he takes possession, the courts will deny him the benefit of a
shorter limitation period and/or the "constructive possession" doctrine.
Moreover, some courts have held that only an adverse claimant who
takes possession in "good faith" can obtain the benefits of "color of title"
even when the statute itself imposes no "good faith" requirement 8 0 -pre-
sumably because these courts, on policy grounds, do not wish to allow an
adverse claimant to obtain any special benefit from showing he held
under "color of title" unless, in fact, he honestly relied upon the docu-
78. Many statutes expressly provide for a shorter limitation period, but not for "constructive
possession," when the adverse claimant holds under "color of title." See, eg., MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§ 600.5801 (1979) (fixing a period of 5 or 10 years when there is a specified kind of "color of title,"
whereas the period is 15 years when there is no "color of title"); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.020
(1962) (10 years when there is no "color of title") & § 7.28.070 (1962) (7 years when there is "color
of title" and payment of taxes). Texas has the greatest range of limitation periods, as well as the
most complex classification of various kinds of "color of title." See TEX. CiV. CODE ANN. ch. 959,
§§ 16.021-.030 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
Other limitation acts--e.g., those of New York and most of the other statutes derived from the
New York Revised Statutes of 1828-provide expressly for "constructive possession" but do not
shorten the limitation period when the adverse claimant holds under "color of title." See, eg., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 322, 323 (Deering 1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-207, 5-209, 5-210 (1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 28-01-06, 28-01-08 (1974); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACT. LAW §§ 511, 521 (Consol. 1985);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-06, 28-01-08 (1974); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-3-1, 15-3-2, 15-
3-10 (1984).
Even when statutory "color of title" provisions provide expressly only for a shorter limitation
period, the courts have generally applied the "constructive possession" doctrine when it would favor
an adverse claimant holding under "color of title." See, eg., Monroe v. Rawlings, 331 Mich. 49, 49
N.W.2d 53 (1951). Moreover, even when there is no statutory "color of title" provision most courts
have given an adverse claimant holding under "color of title" the benefit of the "constructive posses-
sion" doctrine. See, eg., Town of Nantucket v. Mitchell, 271 Mass. 62, 170 N.E. 807 (1930); Mont-
gomery v. Branon, 125 Vt. 362, 216 A.2d 41 (1965).
79. See, eg., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-22 (1978).
80. See, e-g., Lott v. Muldoon Road Baptist Church, Inc., 466 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1970); Reay v.
Butler, 95 Cal. 206, 30 P. 208 (1892); Gochenour v. Logsdon, 375 Ill. 139, 30 N.E.2d 666 (1940);
Lindt v. Uihlein, 116 Iowa 48, 89 N.W. 214 (1902); West v. Middlesex Banking Co., 33 S.D. 465,
146 N.W. 598 (1914); Texas Land Co. v. Williams, 51 Tex. 51 (1879) (semble).
Contra Sparks v. Douglas & Sparks Realty Co., 19 Ariz. 123, 166 P. 285 (1917); Polanski v. Town
of Eagle Point, 30 Wis. 2d 507, 141 N.W.2d 281 (1966). Such decisions are based on the theory that
"good faith" is not an essential component of "color of title" and that the courts should not add it
when the legislature has not expressly imposed a "good faith" requirement.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss1/2
Number 1] ADVERSE POSSESSION AND SUBJECTIVE INTENT
ment constituting his "color of title." One should note, however, that
the "good faith" requirement in "color of title" cases imposes only a
minimal restriction on the adverse claimant."1
Professor Helmholz concedes that the "color of title" cases involve "a
special situation and problem."82 The question is whether even the mini-
mal restriction imposed when "color of title" must be accompanied by
"good faith" is also imposed in adverse possession cases when the ad-
verse claimant does not rely on "color of title."
B. Possession in Good Faith but Without Color of Title
Professor Helmholz asserts that "good faith" is "a positive and rele-
vant factor" in many recent cases in which the adverse claimant was in
possession without "color of title,"8 3 but the recent cases he cites do not
support his assertion. The common characteristic of the cases Professor
Helmholz cites-some from state courts of last resort, 84 some from state
81. The "good faith" requirement
merely means that a person honestly believes that he has acquired a good title regardless of
his knowledge and mental capacity, and it exists wherever possession is taken in belief that
such taking is rightful. Knowledge on the part of the claimant that the title was defective
will not impeach good faith, for a man will speculate in the purchase of land where he
knows that there are imperfections and irregularities in the chain of title, or even when he
has knowledge of another claim under a different [record] title. Where a claimant knows a
title is worthless, [however,] all trace of good faith is lacking, and there is no [effectual]
color of title.... [A]nd when a party claims adversely, it is not necessary for him to show
that he went into possession in good faith, but the burden of showing fraud is upon the
opposite party. If possession is commenced in good faith, subsequent knowledge of out-
standing rights ... is not bad faith to prevent the establishment of title by adverse
possession.
5 G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at § 2663.
The minimal standard of "good faith" depicted in the quoted passage does not apply in some
states if the document claimed to constitute "color of title" is "void on its face." See, eg., Larkin v.
Wilson, 28 Kan. 367 (1882); Hicks v. Hughes, 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953); Lowery v. Garfield
County, 122 Mont. 571, 208 P.2d 478 (1949). Contra Reddick v. Long, 124 Ala. 260, 27 So. 402
(1899); Bloom v. Strauss, 70 Ark. 483, 69 S.W. 548 (1902); Wilson v. Atkinson, 77 Cal. 485, 20 P. 66
(1888); Barger v. Hobbs, 67 Ill. 592 (1873); Jessee v. Jessee, 310 Ky. 565, 221 S.W.2d 462 (1949);
Miesen v. Canfield, 64 Minn. 513, 67 N.W. 632 (1896); Turner v. Sanchez, 50 N.M. 15, 168 P.2d 96
(1946); Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W. 737 (1901); Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell,
125 Va. 565, 100 S.E. 806 (1919).
82. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 337.
83. Id. at 338-41 nn.27-45.
84. Barclay v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 532 S.W.2d 193 (1976); Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co.,
254 Ark, 1002, 298 S.W.2d 2 (1973); Clark v. Mathis, 253 Ark. 416, 486 S.W.2d 77 (1972); Ander-
son v. Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 170 Colo. 7, 458 P.2d 756 (1969); Loewenberg v. Wallace, 151
Conn. 355, 197 A.2d 634 (1964); Morehead v. Parks, 213 Kan. 806, 518 P.2d 544 (1974); Coleman v.
French, 233 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1970); Allen v. Thomas, 215 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1968); Walker v.
Walker, 509 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1974); Crane v. Loy, 436 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. 1968); Hewes v. Bruno,
Washington University Open Scholarship
26 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
intermediate appellate courts,"5 and two from federal courts86-- is that
the true owner argued that the adverse claimant's possession was not ad-
verse and under "claim of right" because the claimant honestly believed
that he owned the land in question. All or most of these cases hold or
state that "honest possession" provides as good a basis for a claim of title
by adverse possession as does "bad faith possession"; but none of these
cases requires "honest possession" or holds that it provides a better basis
for a claim of title by adverse possession than does "bad faith
possession."
A number of the recent cases Professor Helmholz cited in support of
his assertion as to "the relevance of honest possession" involved a dispute
between adjoining landowners, one of whom had been in possession of a
strip of land belonging to the other because of a mistake as to the loca-
tion of the boundary between their parcels of land.17 The authorities are
in conflict as to whether the encroaching possession in such cases is "ad-
verse" and therefore starts the statute of limitations running in favor of
the wrongful possessor. Under the so-called "Connecticut rule," the pos-
session is "adverse" even though the wrongful possessor acted in "good
faith"-e., in the honest belief that he owned the disputed strip of
land-and if apprised of his mistake, would have relinquished posses-
sion.88 Under the so-called "Maine rule," possession of a strip of land
121 N.H. 32, 424 A.2d 1144 (1981); Marmillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258 (1969); Leach v.
West, 504 P.2d 1233 (Okla. 1972); Calfee v. Duke, 544 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1976); Butler v. Hanson,
455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1970); Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 160 W. Va. 84, 232
S.E.2d 524 (1977); Beasley v. Konczal, 87 Wis. 2d 233, 275 N.W.2d 634 (1979).
85. Knapp v. Wise, 122 Ariz. 327, 594 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1979); Brehm v. Johnson, 531 P.2d
991 (Colo. App. 1974); Niles v. Churchill, 29 Colo. App. 283, 482 P.2d 994 (1971); Patient v. Stief,
49 Ill. App. 3d 99, 363 N.E.2d 927 (1977); Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Ill. App. 3d 348, 345 N.E.2d
524 (1976); Ford v. Eckert, 406 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. App. 1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Martin,
170 Ind. App. 519, 353 N.E.2d 474 (1976); Robbins v. Eototf, 39 Mich. App. 589, 197 N.W.2d 912
(1972); Ross v. McNeal, 618 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. App. 1981); Cash v. Gilbreath, 507 S.W.2d 931 (Mo.
App. 1974); West v. Tilley, 33 App. Div. 2d 228, 306 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1970); Root v. Mecom, 542
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
86. Chapman v. Moser, 532 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1976); Gary v. Dane, 411 F.2d 711 (D.C. 1969).
87. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 340-41 nn.36-45.
88. The "Connecticut rule" derives its name from the early leading case of French v. Pearce, 8
Conn. 439 (1831), in which the court stated:
The possession alone, and the qualities immediately attached to it, are regarded.... If he
[the adverse claimant] intends a wrongful disseisin, his actual possession for fifteen years,
gives him a title; or if he occupies what he believes to be his own, a similar possession gives
him a title. Into the recesses of his mind, his motives or purposes, his guilt or innocence,
no inquiry is made. It is for this obvious reason that it is the visible and adverse possession,
with an intention to possess, that constitutes its adverse character, and not the remote
views or belief of the possessor.
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beyond the possessor's boundary is not deemed "adverse" unless the in-
tent of the possessor is "to claim title to all land within a certain bound-
ary on the face of the earth, whether it shall eventually be found to be the
correct one or not." 9 In short, only possession in "bad faith" can be
"adverse" under the "Maine rule."'
Although the "Maine rule" was probably the majority rule at the end
of the nineteenth century, commentators have subjected it to strong criti-
cism for a variety of reasons, including the following:
(1) It is undesirable to have a rule requiring "an inquiry as to the
intention which the possessor may have as to his course of action in case
there should be a mistake, an intention which ordinarily has no existence
whatsoever" and which, even if it exists, may well be undiscoverable.91
(2) Unless the possessor's "intention" was communicated to a third
party, it can only be established by the possessor's testimony; and it is
undesirable to have a legal rule that tempts an adverse claimant who
took possession of land beyond his own boundary because of an "honest
mistake" to testify falsely, when litigation ensues, that he always in-
tended to maintain his actual possession whether it was right or wrong.92
(3) It is undesirable to have a legal rule that results in "better treat-
ment for a ruthless wrongdoer than an honest landowner."93
(4) "In no case except in that of a mistake as to boundary has the
element of mistake been regarded as having any significance, and there is
no reason for attributing greater weight thereto when the mistake is as to
the proper location of a boundary ....
Id. at 443.
89. The rule is called the "Maine rule" because it apparently originated in Preble v. Maine
Cent. R. 85 Me., 260, 27 A. 149 (1893). The Preble court relied upon -itchings v. Morrison, 72 Me.
331 (1881); Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me. 575 (1863); and Lincoln v. Edgercomb, 31 Me. 345 (1850). As
Professor Bordwell noted, the required intent under the "Maine rule" is "a conditional intention to
oust the true owner if a mistake shall appear,"--an intent "hardly likely to exist where no mistake is
dreamed of, and.., hypothetical where the fact of mistake has been raised but not settled ... 
Bordwell, supra note 28, at 153.
90. The "Maine rule" is based on the identification of "adverse possession" with "disseisin,"
which was deemed to require "an express intention to oust the old owner." Bordwell, supra note 28,
at 152. Despite Professor Helmholz's statement to the contrary, the "Connecticut rule" is clearly
older than the "Maine rule."
91. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1159.
92. 1 W. WALSH & R. NILES, CASES ON PROPERTY 220 (2d ed., R. Niles & E. Million, 1951).
93. 7 R. POWELL, supra note 24, at 1015.
94. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1159 n.16 and accompanying text, citing 2 L.
DEMBITZ, LAND TITLES 1397 (1895) as follows: "If possession through mistake were [generally]
held not to be adverse, very little room would be left for the statute of limitations, for almost every
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(5) "The average person in these boundary disputes occupying by
mistake ...knows that his possession is wrongful if he has no title.
Whatever his mental attitude may be if his possession is in fact wrongful,
his neighbor may maintain ejectment against him, and the statute neces-
sarily runs against that right of action ..... 5
The "Connecticut rule" has steadily gained adherents during the twen-
tieth century, and now is clearly the majority rule.9 6  Only two of the
cases Professor Helmholz cites in support of his assertion that "honest
belief seems to matter" really effect a shift from the "Maine rule" to the
"Connecticut rule," 97 and none of the cases cited by Professor Helmholz
man who buys land under a bad title labors under the mistaken idea that his deed is good and
effectual." After citing cases in support of his statement, Dembitz stated,
[t]he court remarks properly in these cases that the occupant's rights depend not on what
he says, but what he does; not on his mental condition, but on his entry. As his mistake
would not have been a defense to an ejectment, the statute began to run when by mistake
he entered.
See L. DEMBITZ 1397 n.194.
95. 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, § 15.5 at 789.
96. The "Connecticut rule" is now the "majority rule." See 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at
§ 15.5 nn. 1-4. However, as Professor Bordwell pointed out more than six decades ago, "Even in a
single jurisdiction the cases are a source of confusion rather than enlightenment." Bordwell, supra
note 28, at 152. See also 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, § 1159, at 844 ("The decisions of a particular
court in this regard are not infrequently lacking in entire consistency . . .and occasionally the
judicial discussion of the subject is such as to leave us somewhat in doubt as to the exact position of
the court on the question.").
97. The two cases are Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258 (1969), and Hewes v.
Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 424 A.2d 1144 (1981), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 340 nn.36 &
37. West v. Tilley, 33 A.D.2d 288, 306 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1970), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note
1, at 340 n.38, simply follows earlier New York cases applying the "Connecticut rule"--e.g., Belotti
v. Bickhardt, 228 N.Y. 296, 127 N.E. 239 (1920), in which the court stated the following rule:
"Adverse possession, even when held by a mistake or through inadvertence, may ripen into a pre-
scriptive right [sic] after 20 years of such possession...; the actual physical occupation and improve-
ment being, in a proper case, sufficient evidence of the intention to hold adversely." Id. at 302, 127
N.E. at 241. However, the attempt of the West court to distinguish Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304
N.Y. 95, 106 N.E.2d 28 (1952), on the ground that "there was no proof that claimant by mistake
placed a building on adjoining lands" and that, "[to the contrary he testified.., that he knew at the
time of construction that the building was not on his land" is based on a failure to read the Van
Valkenburgh case carefully. 33 A.D.2d at 232, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 595. In fact, in Van Valkenburgh,
the adverse claimant had built a garage that encroached on the adjoining tract under the belief that
"he was getting it on his own property," but his possession was held not to be adverse as to the
unintended encroachment. The Van Valkenburgh decision, however, appears to be aberrational.
See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
The rest of the cases cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 340-41 nn.38-40 & 45, to the
extent that they apply the "Connecticut rule," also follow well-established rules in their respective
jurisdictions. Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Il1. App. 3d 348, 345 N.E.2d 524 (1976), cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note 1, at 341 n.40, involved a dispute as to ownership of an entire tract occupied
by the adverse claimant and was not the type of "boundary mistake" case in which courts have
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holds that a possessor who honestly, but mistakenly, believes that he
owns the disputed strip of land should be given more favorable treatment
than one who acts in "bad faith." Both the recent cases and earlier cases
adopting the "Connecticut rule" simply hold that the honest but mis-
taken possessor should not be given less favorable treatment than the
"bad faith" possessor.
98
In addition to the "mistaken boundary" cases, Professor Helmholz
also cites, in support of his conclusion as to "the relevance of honest
possession," a number of cases in which the courts did not treat the ad-
verse claimant's "mistake" as decisive, but nevertheless rejected the true
owner's contention that only possession in "bad faith" could be deemed
to be "adverse," "hostile," and/or "under claim of right" and held that
"good faith" possession would enable the adverse claimant to acquire
title by adverse possession.99 Some of these cases merely mentioned in
passing that the adverse claimant thought he owned the disputed land,
without indicating whether this fact had any particular weight."°° Most
of these cases are not really on point,"'1 although they may contain lan-
applied either the "Maine rule" or the "Connecticut rule." In Beasley v. Knoczal, 87 Wis. 2d 233,
275 N.W.2d 634 (1979), the court applied an unusual variant of the "Connecticut rule" under which
wrongful possession in "good faith" for the statutory limitation period with the "acquiescence" of
the true owner gives the wrongful possessor title to the land possessed. The Wisconsin court said
this rule was adopted to avoid the hardship imposed on honest but mistaken possessors by the
"Maine rule." Elsewhere, the doctrine of "boundaries by acquiescence" seems to be based on the
theory of a tacit "boundary line agreement" evidenced by the parties' "acquiescence" for the statu-
tory limitation period.
98. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 340-41 nn.36-40 & 45. The principal case Professor
Helmholz discusses in the text of Adverse Possession is Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258
(1969); he concedes that "the main reason" given in Mannillo for adopting the "Connecticut rule" is
simply that "no distinction should be drawn between them"-e., between "the willful trespasser"
and "the honest but mistaken trespasser." Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 340.
See also Gary v. Dane, 411 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (applying the settled District of Columbia
rule that "a claim of adverse possession may be rooted in ignorance or mistake" in deciding a "mis-
taken boundary" case). In a footnote supporting its statement as to the D.C. rule, the court said, "It
suffices if there was an intent to possess the disputed area, even if this intent was grounded in igno-
rance or mistaken notions." Id. at 714 n.8. This makes it clear that the court is simply recognizing
that possession in the "honest belief" that the adverse claimant is owner of the "disputed area" is
just as effective as deliberate "bad faith" possession, when an adverse claimant seeks to acquire title
by adverse possession; there is no suggestion that "honest belief" confers any advantage on the
adverse claimant.
99. See, eg., Barclay v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 532 S.W.2d 193 (1976); Calfee v. Duke, 544
S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1976).
100. See, eg., Knapp v. Wise, 122 Ariz. 327, 594 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1919) (plaintiff and de-
fendant succeeded in establishing title by adverse possession to different parcels, each originally
owned by the other).
101. See, eg., Cash v. Gilbreath, 507 S.W.2d 931, 934-35 (Mo. App. 1974) (sole possessor may
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guage that, taken out of context, appears to support Professor Helm-
holz's assertion that "good faith" is a factor favoring the adverse
claimant. Professor Helmholz's quotation of short passages from several
of these cases-entirely out of context-creates a misleading impression
as to "the relevance of honest possession."
For example, Professor Helmholz quotes 02 from Miller v. Fitzpatrick
the following testimony by the adverse claimant's predecessor in title: "I
thought it was my property or I wouldn't have been mowing it."'10 3 This
quotation is used to support Professor Helmholz's assertion that "title
was acquired by possession" in Miller v. Fitzpatrick.1" But in fact the
Miller court held that the possession of the adverse claimant's predeces-
sor was not "adverse," and thus could not be "tacked" to the adverse
claimant's possession, because it was not proved that the predecessor in-
tended to hold any of the land "adversely or hostile" [sic] to the true
owner, the predecessor having taken possession under "the mistaken be-
lief" that his deed covered the property, and having only "intended to
secure the property deeded to him but not to take any property not
within his deed." 105 In short, the court actually held the possession of the
adverse claimant's predecessor was not "adverse" because he acted in
'good faith" instead of "bad faith."
Professor Helmholz summarizes1 06 Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Co. as
follows:
Two parcels of land were claimed by both parties. The defendant was the
record owner of the two parcels, but the plaintiff had been using both of
hold adversely to cotenants even though he did "not intend to take away from the true owner some-
thing which he knows belongs to another," or is "indifferent as to the facts of the legal title," pro-
vided the sole possessor's acts of ownership are "overt and notorious"-"especially... where.., the
land is openly known as the possessor's land and the true owners live in the neighborhood and see
and know of the condition of affairs"); Root v. Mecom, 542 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(possession of trust beneficiary is not adverse to trustee when trustee had no notice of beneficiary's
adverse claim).
See also Chapman v. Moser, 532 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1976), applying TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 5519
(now codified as TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. ch. 959 §§ 16.021-.051 (Vernon Supp. 1985)), which ex-
pressly requires "good faith" in some cases in which there is no "color of title." Article 5519 is a
"residual" limitation provision requiring 25 years of adverse possession in cases not covered by other
limitation provisions. Compare Tax. CIv. CODE ANN. ch. 959 §§ 16.024 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (3
years), 16.025 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (5 years), 16.026 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (10 years).
102. 418 S.W.2d 884 (rex. Civ. App. 1967), quoted in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341.
103. 418 S.W.2d at 889.
104. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341.
105. 418 S.W.2d at 888.
106. 254 Ark. 1002, 498 S.W.2d 2 (1973).
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them. The first parcel the court awarded to the plaintiff, who had "en-
closed and possessed the tract for twenty years in the good faith belief that
[he] owned it." The second the court awarded to the defendant. The plain-
tiff had enclosed the parcel in order to house his dog, but he "admit[ted]
candidly that he knew the land did not belong to him." The distinction in
treatment thus depended on the existence of an honest mistake about the
first parcel, as against a knowing trespass [sic] on the second. 107
A careful reading of Reeves shows, however, that Professor Helmholz's
characterization of the case is both inaccurate and misleading. First, the
court did not decide in favor of the adverse claimants as to the first parcel
because of their "good faith belief" that they owned it. The only con-
tested issues on appeal, as to the first parcel, were (a) whether the adverse
claimants' possession must be deemed permissive because the record
owner had a "practice of allowing its neighbors to use its [vacant] land
permissively," and (b) whether the adverse claimant's possession was
open and notorious when "the encroachment was not readily visible from
the street." The court's decision was negative on both issues because
(a) the true owner's practice was not "brought home" to the adverse
claimants, and (b) it was the true owner's duty "to keep itself informed
with respect to adverse occupancy of its property."108 Second, the court
seemingly based its decision as to the second parcel on the complete lack
of any "claim of right" by the adverse claimants, rather than on their
lack of "good faith." The court stated not only that Mr. Reeves admit-
ted "candidly that he knew the land did not belong to him" 109 but also
that Mr. and Mrs. Reeves "testified that they did not mean to claim any
land they did not own." 110 Professor Helmholz's quotation of the first
statement and omission of the second is thus misleading in suggesting
that it was the Reeves' lack of "good faith" that caused the adverse deci-
sion as to the second parcel.
Professor Helmholz set out1" only part of an excerpt from the trial
transcript quoted in Butler v. Hanson. He used the adverse claimant's
statement, "I figured it [the disputed land] was mine, it was in my fence
107. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 338.
108. 254 Ark. at 1003, 498 S.W.2d at 3.
109. Id. at 1004, 498 S.W.2d at 4.
110. Id. It should be noted that it was doubtful whether Reeves ever established "actual posses-
sion" of the second parcel, which was outside the hedge they planted to mark the boundary of the
first parcel and was used only as the site of an "enclosed pen" to house their dogs after the city
passed a "dog leash law." The brief opinion does not indicate how much of the second parcel the
pen occupied, how substantial the pen was, or how frequently it was used.
111. 455 S.W.2d 942 (Trex. Civ. App. 1970).
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line," '112 to show that "honest belief seems to matter." But a careful
reading of the entire Butler opinion demonstrates that the court simply
held that the evidence-the tract was fenced, the land was used for thirty
or forty years by the claimant and his predecessors under "claim of
right," and "the general reputation in the community was that the prop-
erty was owned by" them' 13 -was sufficient to sustain the trial court's
judgment in favor of the adverse claimant. The court clearly viewed the
excerpt quoted by Professor Helmholz merely as evidence that the ad-
verse claimant held under "a claim of right." The court attached no
special significance to the adverse claimant's "good faith" or lack
thereof."' When the quoted excerpt is read in full, it appears highly
probable that the adverse claimant actually "claimed" all the land within
his fence whether he had legal title to it or not. 115
Professor Helmholz's selective use of quotations from several other
cases, taken out of context, also creates the misleading impression that
"honest possession" was a substantial factor favoring the adverse
claimant. 116
C. The Relevance of an Adverse Claimant's "'Bad Faith"
Professor Helmholz asserts not only that "good faith" is a factor
favoring the adverse claimant, but also-in a section of his article enti-
tled "Cases of Bad Faith Possession"-that "bad faith" is nearly always
fatal to a claim of title by adverse possession. 7 This section is organized
112. Id. at 945, quoted in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341. The quoted statement is part
of a longer excerpt from the transcript set out in the majority opinion, id. at 944-45. See also the full
text of the relevant testimony set out in the dissenting opinion (not the majority opinion as Professor
Helmholz states), id. at 948, 950-52.
113. See 455 S.W.2d at 945-46.
114. The court mentions neither "good faith" nor "honest possession."
115. See 455 S.W.2d at 444-45 (The witness said that, although he knew he did not own "section
3," he nevertheless intended to claim up to the fence, whether or not it enclosed any part of "section
3."). Butler is thus similar to many "mistaken boundary" cases in which an adverse claimant in-
tends both to claim only what he owns and to claim to a marked boundary believed to be correct but
actually enclosing a neighbor's land.
116. See Barclay v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 532 S.W.2d 193 (1976); Robbins v. Eotoff, 39 Mich.
App. 589, 197 N.W.2d 912 (1972), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 338 n.31; Coleman v.
French, 233 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1970), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341 n.44; Crane v.
Loy, 436 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. 1968), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341 n.42. None of
these cases really supports the proposition for which it is cited.
117. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 341-49. This section, entitled "Cases of Bad Faith
Possession," constitutes the core of Adverse Possession. Professor Helmholz began by quoting Jas-
person v. Scharnikow, 150 F. 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1907), as follows: "This idea of acquiring title by
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in a peculiar way, starting with cases in which, he asserts, the courts
refused "to reward the bad faith possessor" by describing his possession
"as somehow less than sufficient to acquire title";"1 8 then considering
cases in which, he asserts, "in order to reach the same result," the courts
have characterized the possession of an adverse claimant who acts in bad
faith as "permissive";119 then considering cases in which, he asserts,
"judges have not felt obliged to resort to any special characterization to
deny the claim of the bad faith possessor";12 ° then considering cases in
which, he asserts, the courts have rejected claims of title by adverse pos-
session because "the evidence show[ed] that the possessor knew enough
of the true state of the title to offer money to the record owner"; 2 ' and,
finally, trying to explain cases in which courts "have awarded title to
adverse possessors who know, or should have known, that the land in
question belonged to someone else when they entered" on the ground
larceny does not go in this country." Id. at 572. It is not clear whether the Jasperson court thought
that a "bona fide claim" was required as a matter of general American law or simply that Washing-
ton law required it. But the rule was then generally settled in the United States that an adverse
possession could be established on the basis of a "claim of right" asserted either in "good faith" or in
"bad faith."
Even if Jasperson were deemed to state a federal common-law rule prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), it clearly could not be considered to have any such effect after Erie.
A "good faith" requirement was not adopted in Washington until two years after the court de-
cided Jasperson. See Ramsey v. Wilson, 52 Wash. 111, 100 P. 177 (1909) (seemingly holding that
possession must be held in "good faith" in order to ripen into title under a 10-year limitation act
which did not require "color of title"). None of the Washington cases the Jasperson court cited so
holds; in all of the cases, the real issue was whether the adverse claimant had any "claim or right" at
all, not whether his "claim" was made in "good faith" or in "bad faith."
Although the "good faith" requirement was repeated in post-Ramsey cases, there are no recent
Washington cases actually holding that "bad faith" precludes acquisition of title by adverse posses-
sion. On the other hand, two cases decided in the 1940's held that an adverse claimant had acquired
title despite his having acted in "bad faith." State v. Stockdale, 34 Wash. 2d 857, 210 P.2d 686
(1949); Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wash. 2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944). These cases have been
deemed to overrule Ramsey sub silentio. See Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washing-
ton, 35 WASH. L. REv. 53, 83-84 (1960). Later cases, however, leave the Washington rule as to
"good faith" uncertain. See, eg., Wickert v. Thompson, 28 Wash. App. 516, 517-18, 624 P.2d 747,
748 (1981), where the court said:
The "claim of right" to which the doctrine refers is simply that the claimant is in posses-
sion as owner, and not in recognition of or subordination to the record title owner.... The
term "good faith" adds only confusion to the doctrine.... Good faith was required for the
original entry only and subsequent discovery of the mistake did not prevent acquisition of
title if the other conditions of adverse possession were met.
See also Sisson v. Koelle, 10 Wash. App. 746, 753 n.2, 520 P.2d 1380, 1384 n.2 (1974).
118. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 342-43.
119. Id. at 343-44.
120. Id. at 344-45.
121. Id. at 345-46.
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that these adverse possessors had strong countervailing "equities."'122
This article will now examine the cases Professor Helmholz cites in sup-
port of each of these propositions. 123
1. Cases in which the Adverse Claimant Assertedly Failed on the
Stated Ground that He Acted in "Bad Faith"
One might suppose that the cases Professor Helmholz cites in support
of the assertion that "[i]n the majority of recent cases which have dealt
with the problem. ... judges have not felt obligated to resort to any
special characterization to deny the claim of the bad faith possessor"
would in fact squarely support Professor Helmholz's conclusions. In
fact, however, the first cited case 24 holds, to the contrary, that an ad-
verse claimant did acquire title by adverse possession to some thirty acres
that he admitted he did not own but "was claiming by limitation."
Although the second case 25 Professor Helmholz cited supports his argu-
ment, it was an Illinois intermediate appellate court decision which the
Illinois Supreme Court almost immediately "disapproved" in an opinion
reaffirming its long-settled rule that a wrongful possession is "adverse"
whether the adverse claimant holds in "good faith" or "bad faith."'126
122. Id. at 347-48.
123. At the end of this section of his article, Professor Helmholz concedes that "three or four
cases decided during the period [examined by him] do ... truly fit the pure possession model of
adverse possession" in that "[iln them the possessor knew he had no title at the time he entered and
he nonetheless prevailed." Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 348 & nn.73-76 (citing a total of 9
cases!).
124. Hoppe v. Sauter, 415 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), cited in Adverse Possession, supra
note 1, at 344 n.59. The disputed 30.833-acre tract was mainly used for cutting timber and was
entirely enclosed as if it were part of an adjoining 100-acre tract the adverse claimants actually
owned. The court quoted a typical statement as to the meaning of "claim of right": "the entry of
the limitation claimant must be with the intent to claim the land as his own, to hold it for himself."
416 S.W.2d at 914. The court held that the adverse claimant's actions "proclaimed their intention to
claim the land as their own." Id. at 915.
125. Hansen v. National Bank of Albany Park, 59 Ill. App. 2d 877, 879, 376 N.E.2d 365, 367
(1978), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 345 n.60, in which the court said, "When an
adverse claimant comes into possession of land thinking that he is not the record title holder, such
possession lacks the requisite hostility for obtaining title by adverse possession." 59 111. App. 3d at
879, 376 N.E.2d at 376.
126. Joiner v. Janssen, 85 Ill. 2d 74, 421 N.E.2d 170 (1980), reversing the judgment of an inter-
mediate appellate panel based on Hansen v. National Bank of Albany Park, 59 Ill. App. 3d 877, 376
N.E.2d 365 (1978). The Supreme Court of Illinois stated that
[t]he quoted statement [from Hansen] which the appellate panel in this case [i.e., Joiner]
deemed binding and dispositive is simply not an accurate statement of the law .... To
hold that because the possessor knows or should know that record title is in another pre-
cludes any possibility of the possessor's title being adverse, is the antithesis of the doctrine
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With one exception, none of the other cases cited by Professor Helmholz
provides any substantial support for his assertion as to the effect of "bad
faith" possession.
One of the cited cases merely held the possession of a tenant or vendee
of the adverse claimant to be the possession of the claimant.12 Another
case held that title to the land in dispute had already "ripened into title"
before the adverse claimants acquired it and, even if this were not true,
that the adverse claimants' possession was "sufficiently adverse to con-
tinue the running of the statute during their occupation of the prop-
erty."12 One of the cases was decided under a statute of limitations that
expressly required both "color of title" and "good faith." '129 In several
cases decided in jurisdictions with statutes requiring a "claim of right,"
the courts held that the required "claim of right" was lacking, but the
opinions do not suggest that "bad faith" was a relevant consideration. 3
In one case in which an "occupying claimant" sought compensation for
the improvements he had installed on the land, the intermediate appel-
late court first recognized that the claimant could not recover unless he
proved "adverse possession... [of] the same character... as will put
into operation the statute of limitations," and then held that the claim-
of adverse possession as it has existed in this state. .. . The possessor's good faith in
claiming title is, of course, required by the statutory provisions relating to possession for
seven years under color of title... it is not relevant under the 20-year doctrine ....
85 Ill. 2d at 80-81, 421 N.E.2d at 173-74. The Joiner court's citation of Illinois Central R.R. v.
Houghton, 126 Ill. 233, 239, 18 N.E. 301, 303 (1888) (adverse possession must be "under claim of
title" but "[i]t need not ... be under a rightful claim") makes it clear that the Illinois courts have
from an early date held that a "claim of right" is sufficient whether asserted in "good faith" or in
"bad faith."
127. SSM Invs. v. Siemers, 291 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. 1980), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note
1, at 345 n.62.
128. Grimstad v. Dordan, 256 Or. 135, 471 P.2d 778 (1970) cited in Adverse Possession, supra
note 1, at 345 n.62. The holding was based on the adverse claimants' testimony; one of them denied
any doubt as to location of the boundary between their tract and the adjoining tract, and the other
"testified that he had no doubt about the correct line between the tracts, but that he was aware of a
probable error in the legal description in his deed" affecting the boundary. Id. at 140, 471 P.2d at
781. The court said that, even if this testimony disclosed a "conscious doubt," it also disclosed a
"hostile" intent to occupy up to what was deemed to be the correct boundary. Id.
129. Baker v. Benedict, 92 N.M. 283, 587 P.2d 430 (1978), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note
I, at 345 n.62, applying N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1-21 (Supp. 1975) ("color of title"), 23-1-22 (Supp.
1975) ("in good faith under color of title").
130. Gerwitz v. Gelsomin, 69 A.D.2d 992, 416 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979); Lewis v. Village of Lyons,
54 A.D.2d 488, 389 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976); Lutz v. Van Valkenburgh, 27 A.D.2d 735, 277 N.Y.S.2d
42 (1967) afJ'd, 21 N.Y.S. 937, 289 N.Y.S.2d 767, 237 N.E.2d 84 (1968); Root v. Mecom, 542
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Hensz v. Linnstaedt, 501 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)-all
cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 345 n.62.
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ant's possession must be in "good faith" as well as under "color of ti-
tle." 131 But the court was clearly incorrect on the latter point, because
the jurisdiction's highest court had settled the law to the contrary.1 32
Most of the cases Professor Helmholz cites, on the other hand, simply
held that the adverse claimant failed to establish one or more of the usual
elements of adverse possession, i.e., "actual,". "open and notorious,"
"hostile," "exclusive," and "continuous" possession.133 In one case, the
court simply held that a motion for judgment on the adverse claimants'
counterclaim was properly refused because they had not proved title by
adverse possession "as a matter of law," and that the adverse possession
issue was properly left to the jury, which found against the adverse
131. Hill v. Cape Coral Bank, 402 So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1981), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note
I, at 345 n.62. The claim for compensation was advanced under ALA. CODE § 6-6-286 (1977),
which authorizes such claims where the defendant "had adverse possession... [of] the same charac-
ter ... as will put into operation the statute of limitations." The court's holding, in effect, incorpo-
rated ALA. CODE § 6-5-200 (1977), which requires either (1) "a deed or other color of title
purporting to convey title to" the adverse claimant, (2) the listing of the land for taxation by the
adverse claimant, or (3) a claim of title based on "descent cast or devise from a predecessor in title
who was in possession of the land."
132. See Foster v. Foster, 267 Ala. 90, 93-94, 100 So. 2d 19, 22 (1958), quoting Newsome v.
Snow, 91 Ala. 641, 642, 8 So. 377, 378 (1890) as follows:
It is not essential that [the adverse claimant's] claim of right should be good, or believed to
be good. Knowledge that his title is defective does not prevent his possession from being
adverse, if the other essential elements exist.... Actual claim of ownership, not the bona
fides or strength of the claim, is the best test or element of adverse possession.
267 Ala. at 93-94, 100 So. 2d at 22.
133. These cases, cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 345 n.62, include the following:
Vick v. Berg, 251 Ark. 573, 473 S.W.2d 858 (1971) (neither "open and notorious" nor "continu-
ous"); Black v. Westwood Properties, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 169 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (neither "open and
notorious" nor "continuous"); Dillaha v. Temple, 590 S.W.2d 331 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) (not "hos-
tile"); Shives v. Niewoehner, 191 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1971) (not "hostile" because occupying coten-
ant did not "oust" other cotenants); Whitehall Leather Co. v. Capek, 4 Mich. App. 52, 143 N.W.2d
779 (1966) (not "hostile" because adverse claimant paid rent; thus no prescriptive easement was
acquired); Wodall v. Ross, 317 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 1975) (neither "actual" nor "open and notorious");
Monnig v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (not "hostile" because "claim of right" was
lacking); John v. Turner, 542 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (not "hostile" because adverse claim-
ant had acknowledged superior title of true owner); Martin v. Randono, 175 Mont. 321, 573 P.2d
1156 (1978) (neither "hostile" nor "exclusive"); Barnes v. Milligan, 200 Neb. 450, 264 N.W.2d 186
(1978) (not "hostile" because "claim of right" was lacking); Foos v. Reuter, 180 Neb. 301, 142
N.W.2d 552 (1966) (not "actual"); Venator v. Ouier, 285 Or. 19, 589 P.2d 731 (1979) (not "hostile"
because of fiduciary relation between the parties); Spangler v. Schaus, 106 R.I. 795, 264 A.2d 161
(1970) (not "hostile" because occupying cotenant did not "oust" cotenants); Holbrook v. Carter, 19
Utah 2d 288, 431 P.2d 123 (1967) (same).
As the parenthetical comments in the preceding paragraph indicate, I do not think the fact that
the adverse claimant was acting in bad faith in some of the cited cases is relevant when the court
ignored that fact and expressly rested its decision on other grounds that provide a perfectly adequate
ratio decidendi.
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claimants. 134
The only case that provides substantial support for Professor Helm-
holz's assertion as to "bad faith" possession is Carpenter v. Ruperto.1
35
The court's holding in Carpenter is hardly surprising, as it simply applied
the long-settled Iowa rule purporting to require "good faith" for acquisi-
tion of title by adverse possession, a rule that can be traced back at least
to 1896. 36 The Carpenter case thus does not represent a recent change in
Iowa law. One should note, moreover, that the Carpenter court's state-
ments that "[k]nowledge of a defect in title is not alone sufficient to pre-
clude proof of good faith" and that "good faith" is negated only "when
knowledge of lack of title is accompanied by knowledge of no basis for
claiming an interest in the property." '13 7 Although the court's meaning is
unclear, these statements appear to water down the Iowa "good faith"
requirement to some extent.
2 Cases in which the Court Held Against the Adverse Claimant on
Other Grounds
Professor Helmholz asserts that in one group of recent cases the ad-
verse claimants actually failed to acquire title by adverse possession be-
cause the court found they held in "bad faith," although the courts
purported to decide against the adverse claimants because their posses-
sion was "somehow less than sufficient." The courts variously described
the possession as "scrambling," "provisional and contingent," or "na-
ked," or as "mere occupancy" or "squatter's" possession in these
cases.1 38 But most of the cases Professor Helmholz cites do not, in fact,
134. Francis v. Stanley, 574 S.w.2d 629, 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (The only conduct amount-
ing to adverse possession the claimants adduced was that they had "cleared and cleaned up the lot,
and [had] mowed and maintained it;" but there was "also evidence that other lot owners in this area
mow and maintain lots they do not claim to own in order to keep up the area and make the property
they do own look better").
135, 315 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1982), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 345 n.62.
136. The earlier Iowa cases the court cited in Ruperto are Creel v. Hammans, 234 Iowa 532, 535,
13 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1944); Goulding v. Shonquist, 159 Iowa 647, 141 N.W. 24 (1913); and
Litchfield v. Sewell, 97 Iowa 247, 251, 66 N.W. 104, 106 (1896) ("there can be no such thing as
adverse possession where the party knows he has no title, and that, under the law, he can acquire
none by his occupation").
137. See 315 N.W.2d at 785. The quoted language is prefaced by the explanation that, "[a]s in
Litchfield, the possessor in Goulding not only knew that he had no title but that he had no claim of
title or any right to enter into possession of the property. He was a mere squatter." This passage
suggests that the Iowa court may really require only some "claim of right," because the court appar-
ently used the term "squatter" to describe one who has no "claim of right" whatsoever. Id.
138. Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 342-43.
Washington University Open Scholarship
38 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
support his assertion. In two of the cases, the courts actually held that
the adverse claimant did acquire title by adverse possession. In one of
these cases, 139 the court's dictum as to "the early American belief that
the squatter should not be able to profit by his trespass"' 40 was not only
irrelevant to the decision of the case 14 1 but clearly suggests that the court
was using "squatter" and "trespasser" as equivalent terms of describe
persons, who by a series of trespasses, violate the true owner's exclusive
right of possession but fail to establish an actual and exclusive possession
of the land in question. In the other case,' 4 2 the court not only held for
the adverse claimant, but distinguished an earlier case in which it had
held that "[t]he occasional cutting of firewood or the taking of rock"
from the disputed tract "could not have been considered other than as a
temporary trespass."'143
In the rest of the cases cited by Professor Helmholz the courts did hold
against the adverse claimants. In one case,'" however, the court really
just applied the "Maine rule" (that possession beyond the adverse claim-
ant's true boundary in the honest but mistaken belief that he owned the
disputed strip of land, is not "adverse") which actually places a premium
on "bad faith." Although the court in another case cited an earlier opin-
ion asserting that a"squatter" can never gain "prescriptive title" to land,
no matter how long he holds it, because his possession can never be con-
sidered "adverse," the court based its decision on the failure of the ad-
verse claimants to prove actual and exclusive possession of the land in
question. The testimony showed that their use of the land (fronting on
the Mississippi River) was shared with "[a]nyone in the country around
there if they wanted to put a boat in or drag out some piling" or fish
there, and that the adverse claimants never tried to exclude anyone from
139. Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 343 n.53.
140. 3 Wash. App. at 399, 477 P.2d at 214, quoted in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 343
n.53.
141. In Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970), the principal issue was
whether sufficient privity existed between successive adverse possessors to permit the "tacking" of
their periods of possession in order to satisfy the requirement of "continuous" possession for the
statutory limitation period.
142. Moss v. James, 411 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1967), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 342
n.48.
143. Id at 107-08, distinguishing Herbst v. Merrifield, 133 Mo. 267, 270, 34 S.W. 571, 572
(1896).
144. Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), cited in Adverse Posses-
sion, supra note 1, at 343 n.49. See supra note 89.
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the property. 145 The other cases 14 6 do not expressly refer to the "good
faith" or "bad faith" of the adverse claimants, and nothing in the opin-
ions suggests that the courts decided these cases on the basis of an un-
stated belief that "bad faith" should bar the adverse claimants, while
disingenuously purporting to base their decisions on the failure of the
claimants to prove actual and exclusion possession of the land in
question.
Professor Helmholz 147 cites another group of cases to support an as-
sertion that the courts really decided against the adverse claimants be-
cause they acted in "bad faith," but characterized the possession of the
adverse claimants as "permissive" to conceal the actual basis of their de-
cision, despite the fact that there was no evidence that the adverse claim-
ants ever sought and obtained actual permission from the true owners.
Professor Helmholz approves of the results in these cases because he be-
lieves an adverse claimant should not be allowed "to take advantage of
145. Wilton Boat Club v. Hazell, 502 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Mo. 1973), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 343 n.51. The term "squatter" is quite ambiguous. It is sometimes used to indicate
that an adverse claimant never established "actual, open and notorious, and exclusive" possession of
the land. It is also sometimes used to describe one who "honestly, though mistakenly," thinks the
United States or the state where the land is located owns the land he possesses. In cases of the
second type, "adverse possessor" status is denied because the possessor lacked any "claim of right"
whatever. The close relation between failure to prove "actual, open and notorious, and exclusive"
possession and a finding that the "squatter" had no "claim of right" is well-illustrated in the follow-
ing passage from Blake v. Shriver, 27 Wash. 593, 595-99, 68 P. 330, 330-32 (1902):
... [lin the great majority of the cases the [initial] squatter, when he desired to leave,
would remove to another portion of the town or country and would sell his improvements
to some other person; it appearing that nothing more than the value of the improvements
was ever obtained at such sales....
The whole testimony convinces us that the claimant.., simply squatted on the land for
present convenience; that he had no color of title or claim of right to it in any sense
whatever; that he did not even intend or think of obtaining title to it, by the statute of
limitations or in any other way, at the time he settled upon it, or for many years thereafter;
that the occupation was purely permissive, by reason for the circumstances .... It is not
such strolling, straggling occupancy as is shown by the testimony in this case that consti-
tutes a notice of adverse possession. It is the history of most cities of this country that
where lands are lying idle, either from being held by non-residents, or from being tied up in
lengthy litigation [as in this case], that a certain class of people squat upon them and build
for present use what are called shacks or shanties, and are frequently not disturbed for
many years. And this is exactly the condition of affairs in Spokane in reference to these
lands in dispute.
146. M.C. Dixon Lumber Co. v. Mathison, 289 Ala. 229, 266 So. 2d 841 (1972), cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note 1, at 342 n.47; DeCola v. Bochatey, 161 Colo. 95, 100, 420 P.2d 395, 397
(1966) ("evidence as to the [hostile] nature and character of [the claimant's] initial use or occupancy
of the subject property was very sketchy at best," and "mere occupancy of part of the property from
time to time ... does not add up to adverse possession"), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at
343 n.50.
147. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 344-45.
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his neighbor's good will, or his timidity, by pointing to his own physical
possession and the absence of any evidence of consent on the part of his
neighbor." 148 Once again, however, the cases he cites to support the ar-
gument as to "the relevance of bad faith" do not, in fact, provide any real
support for his conclusion. In most of the cases, there was substantial
evidence that the adverse claimant's possession was based on the true
owner's permission, express 149 or tacit.' 50 In one of the cases,'I' the ad-
verse claimant's possession did not continue for the full statutory limita-
tion period, and the possession of his predecessors, which had to be
148. Id. at 345.
149. Leon v. Byus, 115 Ariz. 451, 565 P.2d 1312 (Ct. App. 1977) (vendees under land contract);
Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 537 P.2d 631 (1975); Roth v. Flieg, 536 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. 1976);
Roman v. Roman, 485 Pa. 196, 401 A.2d 361 (1979). In Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Lilly
White Church, 505 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), the inference that express permission was
given is practically inescapable. The school district had actually used the school building for school
purposes for a long time before it constructed a school building at a distance of about five feet from
the church. There was testimony that the church used the school yard for parking and used a well,
on the area the school later claimed, as a source of water; that there were graves on the property,
including the part the school later claimed; and that the church "allowed the school District to use
the property." Although the evidence was disputed as to whether a fence divided the school from
the church, there was no evidence that the entry of the school district onto the property was "other
than permissive." The court said that "[t]he erection of the school building near the churchhouse
and the joint use of the property harmoniously for many years" could lead to no other conclusion
than that the church gave permission to the school district to use the property, and held that the
statutory limitation period did not begin to run until the date when the school district's "repudia-
tion" of such permission and its "adverse claim" were "brought home to the church." 505 S.W.2d
at 622-23.
150. Shishilla v. Edmondson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 187, 377 N.E.2d 1115 (1978) (true owner pointed
out surveyor's stakes marking true boundary and adverse claimant "admitted" that a hedge 6 feet
inside the true boundary belonged to true owner; in addition, the adverse claimant never had "exclu-
sive" possession of the disputed strip); Lundelius v. Thompson, 461 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970) (the "agreement" was proved by evidence as to the physical facts and the testimony of the
parties as to the need for and the use of the "fence" relied on by adverse claimant to show adverse
possession). See also Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1978) (claim of prescriptive easement
denied; use was "permissive").
151. Wolgamot v. Corley, 523 S.W.2d 491 (rex. Civ. App. 1975), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 344 nn.57 & 58. The offer to buy was at the amount tentatively fixed by the record
owner, who later stated that he could not sell "at that price." The testimony also indicated that the
adverse claimants' predecessors made no "claim of right" whatsoever: "We just lived there. No-
body claimed it and we didn't claim it either .... It was just there, and so, as far as claiming it, you
don't claim anything that is not yours." 523 S.W.2d at 494. This testimony elicited the following
language, quoted by Professor Helmholz in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 344 n.58. The quoted
language is as follows: "'Peaceable possession,' even accompanied by acts whose prima facie import
is that of hostility may not, in truth be adverse, for the intent of the possessor may bring his acts and
conduct into consonance with recognition of the privileges of the true owner. Intent... is a control-
ling factor." 523 S.W.2d at 495. This, of course, merely states the view that a "claim of right," not
necessarily in "good faith," is essential for "adverse possession."
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"tacked" to that of the adverse claimant, was found to have been "per-
missive" because they had offered to buy the land from the true owner.
In still other cases, the courts found that the adverse claimant's posses-
sion was "permissive" because he was a grantor who retained possession
after making an effective conveyance 152 or was the grantee of a mortga-
gor claiming against the mortgagee. 153  In the last two situations, the
courts have usually presumed the possession to be "permissive" rather
than "adverse" unless there is a disclaimer by the possessor. 154 None of
the cases Professor Helmholz cites provides any basis for his conclusion
that the courts' holdings that the adverse claimant's possession was "per-
missive" were mere subterfuges designed to conceal the courts' determi-
nation not to allow a "bad faith" possessor to acquire title by adverse
possession. 155
The next group of cases Professor Helmholz 156 cites purportedly dem-
onstrates that the courts "regularly" hold that evidence showing "the
possessor knew enough of the true state of the title to offer money to the
record owner" is "inconsistent with the intention necessary to acquire
title by adverse possession" '57 and is fatal to the possessor's claim be-
cause the courts are determined not to allow "bad faith" possessors to
acquire title by adverse possession. This assertion is surprising because
(1) earlier cases generally drew a fairly clear distinction between a genu-
ine offer to buy the land, amounting to a recognition of the true owner's
superior title, and a mere offer to buy immunity from suit;1 58 and
152. Hood v. Denny, 555 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. App. 1977); Runnels v. Whitfield, 593 S.W.2d 388
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
153. Courtney v. Boykin, 356 So. 2d 162, 165 (Ala. 1978) (adverse claimant was grantee of one
who gave mortgage to holder of record title, so possessory acts prior to foreclosure were deemed
"permissive" in the absence of an express "disclaimer" directed to mortgage holder; in addition,
adverse claimant's "rare and widely separated acts do not satisfy the burden [of proof as to adverse
possession]; they constitute mere transitory trespasses").
154. See supra notes 42 & 44 and accompanying text. The problems arising when a grantor
remains in possession are further considered infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
155. In Massey v. Price, 252 Ark. 617, 480 S.W.2d 337 (1972), the court held that the evidence
supported the adverse possessor's claim as to a disputed boundary, but rejected a claimed prescrip-
tive easement because the adverse claimant testified that he just "assumed" that his neighbor did not
object to his use of a small part of his land, and therefore "assumed" that the use was "with his
permission." This case may support the "claim of right" requirement, but certainly does not support
the notion that "bad faith" is fatal to a claim based on adverse possession or adverse use. On the
facts, local custom may, indeed, have established that the use in Massey was "permissive" because it
was "necessary to avoid a ditch."
156. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 345-46 n.62.
157. Id. at 346 n.65.
158. See, eg., Bailey v. Bond, 237 Ala. 59, 185 So. 411 (1928); Calkins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho
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(2) none of the cases Professor Helmholz cites really supports his argu-
ment. Some of these cases do not even involve an offer to pay money. 159
In some of the cited cases, the evidence failed to show that the adverse
claimant ever had "actual" possession of the land. 1" In some cases the
adverse claimant either paid a substantial rent for use of the land, 6 '
150, 237 P.2d 1053 (1952); Munroe v. Pere Marquette Ry., 226 Mich. 158, 197 N.W. 566 (1924);
Sanderson v. MeManus, 252 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1952); Walbrunn v. Ballen, 68 Mo. 164 (1878); Hallo-
well v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322, 34 N.W.2d 404 (1948); Headrick v. Fritts, 93 Tenn. 270, 24 S.W. 11
(1893); State v. Stockdale, 34 Wash. 2d 857, 210 P.2d 686 (1923); Bitonti v. Kauffeld Co., 84 W. V.
727, 120 S.E. 908 (1923); Clithero v. Fenner, 122 Wis. 356, 99 N.W. 1027 (1904). In most of these
cases, the courts treated the question whether there was a real offer to buy or only an attempt to buy
immunity from suit a question of law. Generally, however, it would seem preferable to treat this as a
question of fact, as it was in Sanderson and Walbrunn. To prove that a real offer to buy exists, the
adverse claimant should probably be required to show that he offered to pay an amount approximat-
ing the fair market value of the land; but most of the cases do not discuss the relevance of the
amount the adverse claimant offered to the true owner.
159. See, eg., Gurganus v. Kiker, 286 Ala. 442, 241 So. 2d 113 (1970); Tindle v. Linville, 512
P.2d 176 (Okla. 1973)-both cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346 n.65. In Gurganus,
there is dictum that "a party's offer of compromise is not provable against him as an implied admis-
sion of the weakness of his claim, or of the strength of his adversary's claim," 241 So. 2d at 118,
which is directly contrary to the proposition asserted by Professor Helmholz. In both Gurganus and
Tindle, however, the adverse claimant acknowledged the superior title of the true owner, and in
Tindle the adverse claimant's possession was "permissive" from the start.
160. See, eg., People's Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Sullivan, 336 So. 2d 1304 (Miss. 1976) (adverse
claimants cut timber once, occasionally pastured cattle on the land, and put up a 4-strand wire fence
"through a reed brake" by nailing wire to trees); Magelssen v. Atwill, 152 Mont. 409, 451 P.2d 103
(1969) (statutory definition of actual possession was not satisfied because adverse claimant neither
enclosed, cultivated, nor improved the land, but only grazed cattle thereon); Beaver v. Davis, 275
Or. 209, 550 P.2d 428 (1976) (evidence was conflicting as to when, if ever, the land was fenced; land
was used only for grazing and for cutting firewood), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 346
nn.64-65.
In Magelssen v. Atwill, 152 Mont. 409, 414, 451 P.2d 103, 105 (1969), the court quoted from
Lamme v. Dodson, 4 Mont. 560, 591, 2 P. 298, 303 (1883), to the effect that "the question of adverse
possession is one of intention." But Lamme v. Dodson is not on point at all; it was decided on the
ground that the adverse claimant was originally a tenant of the true owner and that he could not
convert himself into an adverse possessor by making an oral contract to buy the land from his
landlord.
161. See, e-g., Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel Co., 451 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1969) ($200 rental payment
to true owner), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346 n.63; Whitehall Leather Co. v,
Capek, 4 Mich. App. 52, 143 N.W.2d 779 (1966) (adverse claimant paid rent for many years), cited
in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346 n.65. In Ayers, the adverse claimant's testimony was
"ambiguous" as to the reason for making the $200 payment. The true owner's testimony was that
the payment was "rent" at the rate of $50 per month, and it was held that the trial judge's finding
that the $200 was paid as rent was not "clearly erroneous." It would seem that the payment of rent
made the adverse claimant a tenant whose possession was thereafter rightful, but the court placed its
decision on the ground that " [t]he payment of the $200 as rent ... was a recognition of [the true
owner's] title to the property, was inconsistent with [the adverse claimant's] claim of title by adverse
possession, and interrupted the continuity of the adverse possession period .... " 451 P.2d at 582.
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made a genuine offer to buy it,' 62 and/or acknowledged in some other
way the superior title of the true owner so that the latter could reason-
ably infer that the claimant was not holding "adversely" to him.'63 The
adverse claimant's possession in other cases was clearly rightful because
the true owner either (1) expressly gave his permission' or (2) was a
cotenant of the adverse claimant who was never "ousted" or "excluded"
by the adverse claimant.'65 None of the cited cases clearly involved a
mere offer to compromise a doubtful claim or to buy immunity from suit.
In all of these cases, the decisions appear to be correct, but they do not
162. See, e.g., Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346 n.65: Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber
Co., 390 So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1980) ("efforts to buy property from record owner" by grantors of adverse
claimants disproved the "adverseness" of their possession and thus precluded "tacking"); Kittrell v.
Scarborough, 287 Ala. 155, 249 So. 2d 814 (1971) (offer to buy "if the price was right"); Davis v.
Mayweather, 255 Ark. 966, 504 S.W.2d 741 (1974) (adverse claimants tried to "buy out the owners
of the other [undivided] half interest); Dunlop v. Twin Beach Park Ass'n, 111 Mich. App. 261, 264,
314 N.W.2d 578, 579-80 (1981) (adverse claimants really offered to buy the land, not merely "to
compromise a disputed liability or... to make peace in a controversy"); People's Realty & Dev.
Corp. v. Sullivan, 336 So. 2d 1304 (Miss. 1976) (adverse claimants "attempted to buy the disputed
property"); Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 370 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1975) (parties prepared but did
not execute a "sales agreement" after adverse claimant "acknowledged" true owner's superior title);
White v. Chandler, 52 Or. App. 951, 630 P.2d 372 (1981) (adverse claimant offered "to buy the
property"); Spinks v. Estes, 546 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (same); Nagel v. Hopingardner,
464 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (testimony at prior trial, ending in mistrial, as to adverse
claimant's efforts "to purchase the land" from the record owner, was admissible in subsequent trial
"as an admission against interest"). See also Magelssen v. Atwill, 152 Mont. 409, 451 P.2d 103
(1969) (adverse claimant sent true owner a letter acknowledging the latter's superior title and asking
if he "desired to sell"); Beaver v. Davis, 275 Ore. 209, 550 P.2d 428 (1976) (adverse claimants
admitted "that they approached plaintiff [true owner] regarding the purchase of the property").
Cf Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 624 P.2d 522 (1981) (dictum that an offer (or contract) to
purchase an outstanding title does not interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession because it is
not an "acknowledgment of a superior title"), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346 n.65.
163. See, e g., Adverse Possession. supra note 1, at 346 n.65: Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642,
370 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1975) ("Acknowledgement" of true owner's superior title was coupled with
"preparation of a sales agreement;" this constituted a "recognition of the true owner's title and
prevents adverse possession from accruing."); McDonald v. Batson, 501 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973) (acknowledgement of true owner's title before statutory period expires will defeat claim of title
by adverse possession; acknowledgement thereafter will not defeat the claim as a matter of law, but
"it is evidence tending to show the possession was not adverse"). See also Magelssen v. Atwill, 152
Mont. 409, 451 P.2d 103 (1969).
164. See, e.g., Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 199 A.2d 209 (1964) (adverse claimant
in possession under unenforceable oral contract to purchase); Tindle v. Linville, 512 P.2d 176 (Okla.
1973) ("permissive" from the beginning); Spinks v. Estes, 546 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(express "permission to use the land for pasture purposes" at the beginning); all cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note I, at 346 n.65.
165. See, eg., Davis v. Mayweather, 255 Ark. 966, 504 S.W.2d 741 (1974); Dunlop v. Twin
Beach Park Ass'n, Ill Mich. App. 261, 314 N.W.2d 578 (1982) (semble).
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support Professor Helmholz's argument as to the fatal effect of evidence
that the adverse claimant possessed in "bad faith."
Following his discussion of "offer to purchase" cases, Professor Helm-
holz quotes snippets from three other cases to support his assertion that
when the courts "encounter the actual bad faith claimant, they have been
hesitant to favor his claim." 16 6  One of these cases, Carpenter v.
Ruperto,67 simply applied the well-settled Iowa rule requiring "good
faith" on the adverse claimant's part. Neither of the other two cases
supports Professor Helmholz's assertion when the opinions are read in
their entirety. Professor Helmholz states that in Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc.
v. Dill'68 "the record owner's lawyer was allowed to argue to a jury that
the adverse possessor 'reminded him of a vulture watching for its
prey.' ",169 But this does not, as Professor Helmholz asserts, indicate any
judicial disfavor toward "bad faith" adverse claimants when Sandy Ford
Ranch is carefully examined. The claimant's attorney failed to object to
the opposing attorney's argument and thus could not preserve any objec-
tion for appellate review. Hence the only basis for appellate court con-
sideration of the argument in question was a court rule "permitting
reversal and remand for plain errors affecting substantial rights when the
court deems that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted
therefrom."17 The court stated that the language in question was not
"manifestly inflammatory" and "could not confidently be said" to have
"improperly influenced the jury to an unjust result" or to have "deprived
the plaintiff [adverse claimant] of a fair trial in a simple case involving
simple issues,"' 71 and therefore refused to reverse the judgment.
In Hansen v. Pratt,'72 from which Professor Helmholz quotes a state-
ment that "[a] willful trespasser is hardly in a position to assert equitable
rights,"' 73 there was no adverse possession issue at all. The record owner
sued to compel the defendants to remove a part of their driveway that
encroached on plaintiffs' land and the defendants sought to compel plain-
tiffs to convey the land in question to them "for adequate compensation."
The defendants' counterclaim was obviously "equitable" in nature, and
166. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 347.
167. 315 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1982). See also supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
168. 449 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1970).
169. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 347 n.66.
170. 449 S.W.2d at 7.
171. Id.
172. 240 Ark. 746, 402 S.W.2d 108 (1966).
173. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 347 n.68.
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the court was justified in refusing relief because the evidence showed that
there was no mutual mistake as to location of the boundary between the
lands of the parties and that defendants knew the driveway as con-
structed "encroached several feet over the line." '17 4 The Hanson case
thus has no apparent relevance to the law of adverse possession.
3. Cases in Which an Adverse Claimant Succeeded
Professor Helmholz concludes the section of his article dealing with
the relevance of "bad faith" by considering a group of cases in which
adverse claimants were held to have acquired title by adverse possession
despite the fact that they "knew, or should have known, that the land in
question belonged to someone else."' 7 5 He conceded that these cases
"are consistent with the principle that the state of mind of the possessor
is irrelevant,"' 76 but he suggested that "in these cases," with a few excep-
tions, "the courts were as influenced by the equities favoring the claim-
ant, as they were by the doctrine that the possessor's state of mind is
irrelevant." '177 Because Professor Helmholz was discussing the relevance
of "bad faith" and not the more general issue whether "claim of right" is
to be given a subjective meaning, the reader is entitled to conclude that
Professor Helmholz really thinks that in the cited cases the courts
weighed the "equities" of the "bad faith" adverse claimant against those
of the true owner and concluded that the former were stronger. But a
174. 240 Ark. at 749-50, 402 S.W.2d at 110.
175. See Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 347-48 nn.69-74.
176. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 347.
177. See id. at 347-48 nn.69-72, citing Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d
826 (Alaska 1974) (adverse claimant proved "exclusive" and "hostile" possession for statutory pe-
riod); Phoenix Jewish Community Council v. Leon, 102 Ariz. 187, 427 P.2d 138 (1967) (possession
became "adverse," although "permissive" at inception because adverse claimant was contract ven-
dee); Lobro v. Watson, 42 Cal. App. 3d 180, 116 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1974) (possession "adverse,"
although true owner was unaware of his own right to land, if possession "was such as to constitute
reasonable notice that the possessor claimed the land as his own"; no fiduciary relationship between
adverse claimant and his deceased brother-in-law's wife); Ruick v. Twarkins, 171 Conn. 149, 367
A.2d 1380 (1976) (adverse claimant was cotenant of father of other parties, but had clearly "ex-
cluded" them); Guizy v. Kratz, 28 111. App. 3d 500, 328 N.E.2d 699 (1975) (possession "adverse"
though opposing parties were cotenants); Kevil v. Casey, 459 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. App. 1970) (even if
parol gift of land did not provide basis for adverse possession against "donor," it would have some
bearing on "hostility" of possession as against members of family who knew of adverse claim of
"donees"); Olson v. Nordan, 6 Mich. App. 132, 148 N.W.2d 528 (1967) (possession "adverse"
although claimant was father of record owner when possession began); Teeples v. Key, 500 S.W.2d
452 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (possession "adverse" although claimant was husband of record owner
when possession began); Junkerman v. Carruth, 620 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (possession
adverse although claimant was tenant of record owner when possession began).
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careful reading of these cases reveals no substantial basis for such a con-
clusion. In none of the cases did the court intimate that the adverse
claimant's "bad faith," absent countervailing "equities," would have led
to rejection of his claim of title by adverse possession. 178  Professor
Helmhlolz's suggestion that this would have been the result is based on
mere speculation. On the other hand, the prevailing rule that the adverse
claimant's "good faith" or "bad faith" is irrelevant is emphatically stated
in several of the casest 79-including one in which the successful adverse
claimant was said to have acted "fraudulently" as well as in "bad
faith."180
IV. CASES INVOLVING SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Under this heading Professor Helmholz discusses a large group of re-
cent cases that concededly do not "fit" comfortably into his general argu-
ment as to the relevance of "good faith" and "bad faith." This article
will now consider these cases under the sub-headings Professor Helmholz
used.
A. Tax Sale Cases18 '
As Professor Helmholz recognized, when an adverse claimant holds
178. None of the courts in the cited case made "good faith" or "bad faith" an issue, and in most
of the cases it was not even mentioned. As indicated atsupra note 177, the issue in several cases was
whether an initially "permissive"-and therefore "rightful"-possession had become "adverse" so as
to allow the statutory limitation period to run. In two cases, the "exclusivity" of the adverse claim-
ant's possession was in issue. In one case, the issue was whether the true owner's ignorance of his
rights in the land precluded "adverse" possession.
179. See Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska 1974) ("The
question is whether or not the claimant acted toward the land as if he owned it. His beliefs as to the
true legal ownership of the land, his good faith or bad faith in entering into possession (Le., whether
he claimed a legal right to enter, or avowed himself a wrongdoer), are all irrelevant."); Ruick v.
Twarkins, 171 Conn. 149, 158, 367 A.2d 1380, 1385 (1976) ("[T]itle may be acquired even though
the possessor knows that he is occupying wholly without right; all that is necessary to prove is that
there was a user as of right, that is, one in disregard of any rights of the holder of the legal title,"
(quoting Horowitz v. F.E. Spencer Co., 132 Conn. 373, 378, 44 A.2d 702, 705 (1945)).
180. See Ruick v. Twarkins, 171 Conn. 149, 157, 267 A.2d 1380, 1384 (1976) ("The defendant's
contention that the probate decree, void because obtained [by the adverse claimant] by fraud, may
not furnish proof of the elements of ouster and claim of right against the cotenants is without
merit.").
181. This sub-heading is something of a misnomer, because Professor Helmholz only discusses
cases in which the adverse claimant held under a defective tax deed; no consideration is given to
cases in which the adverse claimant held under a tax sale certificate which, rather than the
subsequently issued tax deed, vested title in the tax sale purchaser under state law. See Annot, 38
A.L.R.2d 986, 1087-88 (1954).
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under "color of title" and seeks the benefit of a shorter limitation period
or seeks to extend his possession "constructively" to land not actually
possessed, either express statutory language or case law requires "good
faith" in many jurisdictions. 182  The cases applying this requirement
when the "color of title" consists of a defective tax deed raise no special
issues, 83 and it is unclear why Professor Helmholz devoted almost two
pages of his article to these cases. The first cited case 84 is said to show
that Illinois requires "good faith" in defective tax deed cases when the
adverse claimant relies on the deed as "color of title" sufficient to give
him the benefit of a short statutory limitation period. But the applicable
Illinois statutory "color of title" section expressly requires "good
faith,"' 85 and the case simply interprets "good faith" as requiring the
holder of the tax deed to make "diligent inquiry" to locate and notify the
owners of the land of his purchase of the land at the tax sale.' 86 None of
the other cited cases is relevant to Professor Helmholz's argument.
187
182. See Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 337 nn.21-23. See also supra note 80 and accompa-
nying text.
183. For a thorough discussion of the defective tax deed cases, see Annot. 38 A.L.R.2d 986
(1954).
184. Payne v. Williams, 91 111. App. 3d 336, 46 Ill. Dec. 783, 414 N.E.2d 836 (1980).
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 6 (1966).
186. The court stated that the failure to make "diligent inquiry," required by statute before a tax
deed could be obtained, not only made the tax deed void, but also meant that the tax deed was
"fraudulently obtained," and hence that it could not "constitute color of title." See 91111. App. 2d
at 343, 414 N.E.2d at 841. In some states, a defective tax deed may constitute "color of title" even if
it is "void on its face," provided it contains a description sufficient for indentification of the land and
location of its boundaries. In other states, courts have held that a tax deed "void on its face" can
never constitute "color of title." See Annot. 28 A.L.R.2d 986, 1023 (1954).
One should note that the property involved in Payne was a severed "mineral estate" that the
plaintiffs had never actually possessed. This provided another reason why they could not prevail
under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 6 (1966). Nor could they prevail under id. § 7, which applies to
vacant lands and does not expressly require the claimant under "color of title" to be in possession,
because the Illinois courts have required the claimant of a severed "mineral estate" to show actual
possession before he can prevail. The rationale seems to be that, absent the claimant's actual posses-
sion, the record owner of the mineral estate is "constructively" in possession, so that the mineral
estate does not constitute "vacant lands." Lack of actual possession also precluded the plaintiff in
Payne from acquiring title by adverse possession under the general 20-year statute of limitation.
187. See Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 350 n.80, citing: English v. Brantley, 361 So. 2d 549
(Ala. 1978) (tax sale purchaser who never obtained a tax deed had no "color of title" as defined by
statute; he nevertheless obtained title under short 3-year limitation period provided in ALA. CODE
§ 40-10-82 (1975)); Stolz v. Maloney, 129 Ariz. 264, 630 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1981) (acquisition of
valid tax deed is not "ouster" of non-occupying cotenants so as to make occupying cotenant's posses-
sion "adverse"); Nicholas v. Giles, 102 Ariz. 130, 426 P.2d 398 (1967) (defective tax deed, standing
alone, was not "color of title" because the Arizona statute defined "color of title" as "a constructive
chain of transfers" containing formal defects only; but the deed was effective to give an adverse
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According to Professor Helmholz the last case cited in this section,
Brylinski v. Cooper,188 states that "the tax deed stands lower than a deed
interpartes for adverse possession purposes," but does give the purchaser
more rights than "mere squatters or those who seek to aggrandize their
holdings by appropriation." '189 However, this is not what the Brylinski
opinion states, and the quoted snippet creates a totally misleading im-
pression. What Brylinski actually states is as follows: 190
The color of title requirement [applicable in New Mexico to all adverse
possession cases] protects landowners from the unjust use of the doctrine of
adverse possession by mere squatters or those who seek to aggrandize their
holdings by appropriation.... We are mindful that the test of the validity
of a deed is stricter for a tax deed than for a deed inter partes. This is so
that (1) the owner may have information of the claim made upon his prop-
erty; (2) the public may be notified what property is offered for sale; and
(3) the purchaser may obtain a sufficient conveyance.
We feel, however, that his doctrine has no application to the color of title
requirement because the interests of the assessed owner, the public, and the
purchaser are adequately served by compliance with all elements of the doc-
trine of adverse possession. A landowner might fairly complain where his
land is sold following an improper assessment. But he has no just cause for
complaint where the purchaser has openly possessed the property under
color of title for the prescriptive period and paid taxes thereon.
When accurately quoted, this passage makes it clear that the New
Mexico court carefully distinguished between the strict requirements for
a valid tax sale and the issuance of a valid tax deed and the less strict
requirements for establishing an effective adverse possession under an in-
valid tax deed relied upon to satisfy the New Mexico statutory require-
ment that every adverse possession be under "color of title." In fact, the
court held that although insufficiency of the land description in the as-
sessment and in the tax deed made the deed invalid, it could serve as
"color of title" if the description in the tax deed, when aided by extrinsic
claimant title under a statute requiring 5 years' possession under a "recorded deed"); Horn v. Bla-
ney, 268 Ark. 885, 597 S.W.2d 109 (Ct. App. 1980) (tax sale void because the United States owned
the land at time of sale, but tax deed was "color of title"); Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co., 310 So. 2d
772, 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) ("A tax deed, whether valid or invalid, is color of title.") cert. denied,
321 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1975); Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 624 P.2d 522 (1981), cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note 1, at 351 n.81. See also infra note 188 and accompanying text.
188. 95 N.M. 580, 624 P.2d 522 (1981).
189. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 351. Professor Helmholz purported to paraphrase
the court's language, along with a quoted snippet from the opinion.
190. 95 N.M. at 584, 624 P.2d at 526.
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evidence, "is sufficient to identify the property in dispute."19 ' Nothing in
the opinion remotely suggests that "the tax deed stands lower than a
deed inter partes for adverse possession purposes."
B. Cases In Which A Grantor Retains Possession
Professor Helmholz states that he has "conceptual problems" with the
recent adverse possession cases in which a grantor retained possession
after making an effective conveyance of land. In these cases, the gran-
tor's possession is generally presumed to be "permissive," and the pre-
sumption 192 can be rebutted only by "unequivocally hostile acts" of the
grantor. On one hand, Professor Helmholz argues, "the strength of the
presumption is scarcely comprehensible if one takes a pure possession
approach" to adverse possession, but on the other, he concedes "the situ-
ation also fits uncomfortably with a good faith test" because "if the law
permits him [the grantor] to acquire title by adverse possession by acts of
actual hostility, . . . the law must be allowing an advantage to one who
possesses in bad faith."' 93 He then attempts to minimize the importance
of this apparent judicial rejection of any "good faith test" by pointing out
that "most of the only cases decided in favor of the grantor-possessor
have been mistake cases, that is, cases where the grantor, and usually the
grantee as well, believed that the deed did not cover the land in dispute"
and, therefore, "no bad faith exists. ' 94
191. Id. at 583, 584, 624 P.2d at 525, 526.
192. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 351. See also id. at 352, where Professor Helmholz
states that "[w]here the grantor continues in possession, the same external acts of ownership (eg.,
cultivation, improvements, payment of taxes) are uniformly held to be insufficient notice of a claim
to constitute hostility." Id. In some of the cases cited, id. at 352 n.83, a family relationship between
grantor and grantee, or concurrent possession by grantor and grantee, or the existence of concurrent
ownership between grantor and grantee strengthened the presumption. See Wojahn v. Johnson, 297
N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1980); Toxcano v. Delgado, 506 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Petty v.
Dunn, 419 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
In Brown v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 1978), the decision went too far in applying the pre-
sumption, because the grantee had returned the deeds to the grantor and the conveyance seems to
have been a "sham," with the grantee serving only as a "straw man." In McClellan v. King, 133 Ill.
App. 2d 914, 273 N.E.2d 696 (1971), proof that the grantee had begun an earlier action to enjoin the
grantor's use of the land, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute the action, rebutted the pre-
sumption. This, the court held, made the continuing possession of the grantor "hostile." Jones v.
Brown, 242 Ark. 537, 414 S.W.2d 618 (1967), was decided in part by application of the rule that
long-continuing possession by the grantor (15 years) would "rebut the presumption that continued
possession by a grantor of land deeded to a grantee is subordinate to the title of the grantee." Id. at
541, 414 S.W.2d at 620.
193. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 351-52.
194. Id.
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I do not agree that the strength of the presumption of "permissive-
ness" in cases in which a grantor retains possession of land after he con-
veys it is "incomprehensible." The presumption is based in part, as
Professor Helmholz recognizes, on the same policy that underlies the
doctrine of "estoppel by deed," that is, "the principle that a grantor
should not in fairness be allowed to claim in derogation of his own
deed." '195 Perhaps Professor Helmholz's conceptual difficulties with the
retained possession cases are caused by his failure to distinguish three
quite different fact situations. In the first situation, the grantor and
grantee are "strangers" dealing with each other at arm's length; the
grantee pays a fair price for the land; and the grantor retains possession
of the entire tract conveyed. In the second situation, the grantor and
grantee are related by blood or marriage and are not dealing at arm's
length; the conveyance is often gratuitous; and the grantor retains posses-
sion of the entire tract conveyed. In the third situation, the land in dis-
pute is a strip located on one edge of the land conveyed and contiguous
to other land the grantor owns that was not included in the conveyance,
and the grantor mistakenly thinks that the disputed strip of land was not
included in the conveyance. In the third situation, the mistake often
stems from the existence of a fence that is thought to mark the boundary
of the land conveyed but is actually located inside that boundary.
In the first situation, the policy against allowing a grantor to "derogate
from his grant" has a strong basis. Moreover, it is reasonable to infer
that actual permission for the grantor's retention of possession was ob-
tained from the grantee because otherwise the conduct of the parties is
incomprehensible.' 96 Hence the courts have required proof of "unequiv-
ocally hostile acts" before the grantor's retained possession will be
deemed adverse to the grantee. However, since any inference of actual
permission becomes less reasonable as time passes, it has been held that
the grantor's retention of possession for a long time destroys the pre-
sumption that the grantor's possession is "permissive." 197
195. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 351. The underlying policy is applicable whether or
not the deed contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment and/or a covenant of warranty. When the
deed contains such a covenant, the grantor's adverse possession would, of course, amount to a
breach of the covenant.
196. The grantee would normally take possession of the land in such a case unless there were an
agreement to permit the grantor to retain possession as a tenant of some kind. The grantee some-
times gives the grantor a written lease, but the grantee's oral permission for the grantor to continue
in possession will make the latter a tenant at will.
197. See, eg., Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498, 525 (1878) ("when the possession has been for a
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In the second situation, the policy against allowing a grantor to "dero-
gate from his grant" may be weaker, especially if the conveyance is gra-
tuitous; but the relationship between the parties provides a separate basis
for presuming that the grantor's retention of possession was with the
grantee's permission. Several of the cases Professor Helmholz cites in-
volved this second fact situation and resulted in holdings that the gran-
tor's possession was not "hostile" to the grantee.198
In the third fact situation, if the cases Professor Helmholz cites are an
accurate guide, the courts generally do not recognize any presumption
that the grantor's possession is "permissive" in "mistaken boundary"
cases. 199 Although his conclusion is ambiguous, Professor Helmholz ap-
parently thinks that the explanation for these cases, which represent an
exception to the general rule applied when a grantor retains land effec-
tively conveyed to another, is that the courts favor the "good faith" ad-
verse claimant. It is more likely, however, that the cases allowing the
grantor to acquire title to a strip of land retained in his possession be-
cause of a mistake as to the boundary of the land conveyed are based on
long period, the presumption of a claim of right hostile to the title granted does arise in every case
where such possession is inconsistent with the rights of the grantee, and... in such case a court or
jury might find the possession adverse from the nature of the possession, without proof of an express
declaration on the part of the occupant that he claimed to hold in hostility to the grant").
198. See, eg., Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1980). Even in this fact situation, the
grantor's long-continued possession, in excess of the statutory limitation period, has been held to
"overcome" the presumption. See also Jones v. Brown, 242 Ark. 537, 414 S.W.2d 618 (1967) (statu-
tory limitation period was 15 years); Hailer v. Hailer, 225 Ark. 882, 286 S.W.2d 331 (1956) (posses-
sion for 30 years; statutory limitation period was 7 years).
199. See Jones v. Brown, 242 Ark. 537, 414 S.W.2d 618 (1967); McClellan v. King, 133 Ill. App.
2d 914, 273 N.E.2d 696 (1971) (semble); Colley v. Carpenter, 172 Ind. App. 638, 362 N.E.2d 163
(1977) (semble); Rider v. Pottratz, 246 Or. 454, 455, 425 P.2d 766, 767 (1967) ("presumption of
subservient holding has no basis in fact when the grantor's possession is continued under the belief,
mistaken though it be, that the area in question was not included in the grant"); Darling v. Ennis,
138 Vt. 311, 315, 415 A.2d 228, 231 (1980) ("presumption that the grantor's rights are subordinate
to the grantee's rights has no room for operation when the grantor believes, however mistakenly,
that the disputed property was not included in the grant"); Lindl v. Ozanne, 85 Wis. 2d 424, 431,
270 N.W.2d 249, 253 (App. 1978) (quoting Rider).
In Rider, the court relied on the following statement from Stockwell v. Gibbons, 58 Wash. 2d 391,
396, 363 P.2d 111, 114 (1961):
This exception applies in those cases in which the grantor gives up possession of the major
part of the property conveyed but remains in possession of a portion of it under the mis-
taken belief that it was not conveyed. Under such facts there is no validity to the assump-
tion, upon which the general rule is based, that the grantor remains in possession
permissively under the grantee.
Accord Robinson v. Douglass, 2 Aik. 364, 367 (Vt. 1827).
All of these cases are from jurisdictions that have adopted the "Connecticut rule" with respect to
"mistaken boundary" cases.
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(1) a belief that the policy basis of the presumption that the grantor's
possession is "permissive" is weak when he retains only a small part of
the land conveyed, and (2) a desire to apply the "Connecticut rule" in all
"mistaken boundary" cases. None of the cases suggests that "good
faith" is a factor that favors the adverse claimant. The only way to test
Professor Helmholz's conclusion would be to find cases in which the
grantor retained only a small part of the land covered by his deed and
was shown to have acted in "bad faith." Research has revealed no such
cases.
C. Cases Involving Cotenants
In the group of cases involving cotenants, the courts have almost uni-
formly held that "[o]nly where the cotenant in possession ousts his fel-
low, or... repudiates the cotenancy by acts or words which give notice
of his intention to claim sole ownership, can there be a possibility of ad-
verse possession. ' 'z"° The reason for such holdings is obvious; absent
"ouster," "exclusion," or "repudiation," the sole possession of one coten-
ant is not wrongful as against other cotenants who do not choose to as-
sert their concurrent right of possession, and the latter have no cause of
action against the occupying cotenant. It is unnecessary to advert to the
relationship of "trust and confidence" between cotenantsZOl-a relation-
ship that is crucial when the courts deal with cases in which one cotenant
has acquired an outstanding title or interest and seeks to assert it to the
prejudice of the other cotenants. Judicial opinions generally do not sug-
gest that the "good faith" or "bad faith" of the occupying cotenant has
any relevance on the issue of adverse possession. The real problem in the
cotenancy cases is to determine what conduct by the occupying cotenant
will amount to an "ouster" or "exclusion" of the other cotenants, or to a
"repudiation" of their rights, so as to make the occupying cotenant's pos-
session "adverse."
It is true, as Professor Helmholz states, that merely "behaving like the
sole owner" will not ordinarily be sufficient to make the occupying coten-
ant's possession "adverse"; there must be an "exclusion," "ouster" or
"repudiation." 02 However, the cases Professor Helmholz surveyed in-
200. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 353.
201. Id.
202. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 354 (citing cases holding that "[s]ole possession,
even when coupled with the 'payment of mortgage and taxes, [the] effecting [of] major improvements
and repairs, [and the] leasing out and keeping [of] the rents, issues and profits' is generally held to be
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cluded a fair number in which the court did rule in favor of the occupy-
ing cotenant. Professor Helmholz asserts that there are a larger number
of favorable rulings "than is consistent with the conclusiveness of the
rule,- 20 3 that is, with the strong presumption that the sole possession of
one cotenant is not "adverse" to the others. But the basis for this judg-
ment is not clear. In any case, his conclusion that the cases holding in
favor of occupying cotenants are strongly influenced by the presence or
absence of "good faith" on the part of the latter is significant only if the
cases he cites in fact support the conclusion. These cases are of three
types:2°  (1) cases in which siblings (either actual or prospective coten-
ants) "make an oral agreement or reach a 'family understanding' to the
effect that one of them will be entitled to the land"; (2) cases in which the
occupying cotenant purported to convey sole ownership in severalty to a
stranger who, although negligent in failing to examine the grantor's title,
nevertheless believed that he was acquiring sole ownership of the land;
and (3) cases in which the other cotenants "allow one of their number to
go into possession, to pay all taxes, to make improvements to the prop-
erty and in fact to become generally known as the owner," and "do noth-
ing until after many years go by." The first and second types of cases
may, of course, overlap.
L "Oral Agreement" and "Family Understanding" Cases
In cases in which the occupying cotenant is obviously acting in "good
faith," Professor Helmolz suggests that the cases holding that the occu-
pying cotenant has acquired title by adverse possession are really based
on the "equities" of the occupying cotenant, although the courts purport-
edly "will reach the result by holding that the 'hostile' possession began
on the date of the oral grant or the 'family understanding.' "205 His ref-
erence to "equities" presumably indicates that the facts are such as to
raise an "equitable estoppel" against assertion of the strict "legal" rights
of the non-occupying cotenants. To the extent that the courts do in fact
rely on "equitable estoppel" as the basis of their decision, it is obvious
that the cotenants must show "justifiable" or "good faith" reliance on the
representations or promises of the other cotenants. But no clear ration-
insufficient" to prove "hostility" against the other cotenants). For an exhaustive citation of cases to
the same effect, see 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1155.
203. Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 354.
204. Id. at 354-56.
205. Id. at 355.
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ale emerges from an examination of these cases, each of which seems to
have been decided on the basis of its own peculiar facts.
In Bayless v. Alexander,2 "6 for example, the original occupying coten-
ant received a quitclaim deed that was intended to convey the expectan-
cies of his siblings, but was ineffective to convey the expectancy of one
sibling who predeceased the parent, and whose heirs later sought to as-
sert rights as cotenants against the grantee's widow. The court held that
the grantee's sole possession after the parent's death was not "adverse,"
because there was "no evidence of actual notice" to the other cotenants
that he "claimed in the entirety"; but the court further held that the
widow's possession was "adverse" by virtue of a well-settled rule that
"entry of an heir into the possession of property with a notorious claim
of exclusive right may disseize the other heirs, his cotenants."2 °7 The
court stated that "[t]he fiduciary relationship presumed to exist between
cotenants... has no application here, since the circumstances surround-
ing the appellee's acquisition of title completely negates any such rela-
tion, to the extent that we conclude it was the equivalent of an ouster of
the other cotenants."2 °8 It was probably true that the widow believed in
"good faith," that she had acquired sole ownership by virtue of the quit-
claim deed to her husband-which makes the case, in substance, a type-
(2) case rather than a type-(1) case-but the court does not appear to
have considered her "good faith" significant. Nothing in the opinion in-
dicates that the court was disingenuous in invoking the rule that entry
with a notorious claim of exclusive right may disseize the other
cotenants.
In Cash v. Gilbreath,2 "9 siblings attempted to quitclaim their expectan-
cies to one of their number during their parent's lifetime. The deed was
held to be ineffective, but the court also held that it constituted a strong
basis for concluding that the grantee's sole possession was "adverse," es-
pecially after it was recorded. Far from relying on the occupying claim-
ant's "good faith," the court was anxious to point out that "good faith"
was not fatal to a claim of title by adverse possession. The court stated,
"The possessor need not intend to take away from the true owner some-
thing which he knows belongs to another, or even that he be indifferent
206. 245 So. 2d 17 (Miss. 1971), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 355 n.92.
207. 245 So. 2d at 21.
208. Id
209. 507 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. App. 1974), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 355 n.92.
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as to the facts of the legal title. 21°
In Foss v. Paulson,2 1 1 it was unclear whether the nonoccupying coten-
ant had effectively quitclaimed her interest to her cotenant (her husband)
or whether her cotenant's administrator, acting on behalf of her coten-
ant's sole heir, had wrongfully ousted her. Under the first alternative,
her cotenant was the sole owner at the time of his death, and his sole heir
necessarily became sole owner. Under the second alternative, the posses-
sion of her cotenant's sole heir was obviously "adverse" to the non-occu-
pying cotenant.
The occupying cotenant in Petrusic v. Carson,21 2 obtained a deed from
another cotenant, apparently relying on a probate decree awarding sole
ownership to her, and thereafter maintained sole possession for some
thirty-seven years before the institution of the suit. Under the circum-
stances, the court held there was "sufficient" notice to the cotenants out
of possession, that the occupying cotenant was holding adversely, "if
they had paid proper attention to their rights. '213 This case seems to be
a hybrid of the second and third types that Professor Helmholz sets out.
The court devoted almost the entire opinion to discussion of the "notice"
issue, and was apparently unimpressed by the occupying cotenant's
"equities."
Before considering the second group of cases, one should note that any
oral agreement or understanding between the occupying cotenant and
other cotenants to the effect that he shall "be entitled to the land," or any
oral agreement with the sole owner that one of several potential heirs
shall be "entitled to the land" should result in the court's treating the
occupying cotenant's possession as "adverse" from its inception because
the possession is clearly under a "claim of right" and the other cotenants
are aware of the occupying cotenant's claim. The situation is essentially
like that resulting from an ancestor's attempt to make a "parol gift" of
land to one of his potential heirs.214
210. 507 S.W.2d at 934.
211. 255 Or. 167, 465 P.2d 221 (1970), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 355 n.92.
212. 496 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1972), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 355 n.92.
213. 496 P.2d at 74.
214. For a case holding the grantee's possession under an attempted "parol gift" to be "adverse",
see Nevells v. Carter, 122 Me. 81, 119 A. 62 (1922). To be adverse, however, the claimant must have
an honest belief that the parol gift was legally effective. O'Boyle v. Kelley, 249 Pa. 13, 94 A. 448
(1915). Some courts apparently hold the possession not to be adverse if the parol gift is "condi-
tional" or "executory" (i.e., not to be "absolute" until the donee has fully performed some agree-
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2. Cases in Which a Sole Possessor is a Grantee Who is not Aware
that He is a Cotenant
In cases of the second type, courts have long recognized that the sole
possession of the grantee who obtains a deed purporting to convey sole
ownership to him should be deemed "adverse" from its inception.215 As
Professor Tiffany points out, any other cotenant
is charged with notice of the fact that a person other than his original coten-
ant is in possession of the land, and he is also charged with notice of the
character of the claim of such person, and cannot assume that it is other
than such as is indicated by the conveyance under which he holds.216
Cases from almost all jurisdictions support this rule,217 although only
one of the three cases cited by Professor Helmholz purported to apply
the rule.218 The reason for the rule is that the nonoccupying cotenants
are charged with notice of the nature of the claim of the original occupy-
ing cotenant's grantee-not that the grantee honestly believes that he has
acquired sole ownership. None of the cases cited by Professor Helmholz
indicates that the grantee's "good faith" or lack of "good faith" is
relevant.
3. Cases in Which the Occupying Cotenant's Possession Continues
for a Very Long Time
Professor Helmholz asserts that, in cases of long-continued occupation
by one cotenant accompanied by owner-like conduct, the courts "some-
times find that the possessor has been in possession with implied hostility
and award him title," although under the generally applicable rule the
ment, such as an agreement to take care of the donor during his lifetime). See Kevil v. Casey, 459
S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
215. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1185, at 945-46.
216. Id.
If, however, the conveyance purports to be, not of the entire interest in the property, but of
the interest of the grantor merely, the possession of the grantee is prima facie like that of
his grantor, that of a cotenant only, and not adverse to the other cotenant, and the latter is
justified in assuming this to be the case.
217. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, § 1185 at 932 n.35.
218. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 355 n.93. The court applied the rule in Hardy v.
Lynch, 258 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1972), in which the rule seems to be limited by a requirement that the
deed under which the occupying cotenant claims must be recorded. Neither Collier v. Welker, 19
N.C. App. 617, 199 S.E.2d 691 (1973), nor Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn. App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769 (1965),
recognized or applied the rule. Both cases, instead, relied on the stated rule that an occupying
cotenant may acquire a "prescriptive title" by 20 years of sole and uninterrupted possession, "in-
dependent of the statute of limitations." As to "prescriptive title," see supra notes 12-22 and accom-
panying text.
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non-occupying cotenants "should be able to count on the presumption
that the possession of the cotenant on the land is consistent with their
rights." '219 There are, indeed, many cases holding the occupying coten-
ant's possession to be adverse when it has continued for a very long time
(e.g., from twenty to forty years) even though he has never done anything
more than behave as if he were the sole owner.220 As stated by Tiffany,
the rationale of these cases is that "men do not ordinarily sleep on their
rights for so long a period, and a strong presumption arises that actual
proof of the original ouster has become lost by lapse of time." '221 Profes-
sor Helmholz, however, believes that "equitable" factors explain the re-
sults.222 Unfortunately, only one of the cases he cites supports his
belief.223 In two of the cited cases, the occupying tenant took possession
in reliance on a written instrument that, although void, purported to vest
him with sole ownership, and the possession was therefore clearly "ad-
verse." '224 Two of the cases Professor Helmholz cited held that an occu-
pying cotenant's long-continued and uninterrupted possession creates a
"title by prescription." 2 None of these cases suggests that the court
was basing its decision on the "equities" of the occupying cotenant. One
case expressly relies on a "presumption of ouster" and also states that
"[t]he rule of presumption of rightful possession after 20 years is
designed 'to prevent stale demands' from those who have slept on their
rights for so long a period and 'to protect possessors from the loss of
219. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 356.
220. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, § 1185, at 937-38 n.9.
221. Id. at 930. Petrusic v. Carson, 496 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1972), could be explained on this ground,
because the sole possession of the occupying cotenant lasted for 37 years before her possession was
challenged in court.
222. See supra note 205.
223. Guinzy v. Kratz, 28 Ill. App. 3d 500, 328 N.E.2d 699 (1975), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 356 n.95.
224. Ruick v. Twarkins, 171 Conn. 149, 367 A.2d 1380 (1976) (fraudulently obtained probate
decree); cited in Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 356 n.95; Caywood v. January, 455 P.2d 49
(Okla. 1969) (deed executed by Indian void because neither Secretary of Interior nor county court
approved), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 356 n.95.
225. See Morgan v. Dillard, 61 Tenn. App. 519, 456 S.W.2d 359 (1970), cited in Adverse Posses-
sion, supra note I, at 356 n.95; Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn. App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769 (1966), cited in
Adverse Possession, supra note I, at 355 n.93. In Hill, the court stated that the presumption on which
the "prescriptive title" is based "arises independent of the statute of limitations." 55 Tenn. App. at
616, 403 S.W.2d at 781. The prescriptive period in Tennessee is 20 years, while the statutory limita-
tion period is 7 years. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-2-103 (1980). The doctrine of "prescription"
based on a "presumed grant," as applied to corporeal interests in land, is discussed supra notes 12-22
and accompanying text.
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evidence from lapse of time.' ,226
Finally, with respect to Professor Helmholz's statement that "most co-
tenants who successfully claim title after possession for the statutory pe-
riod have held the land in the honest belief that they had a right to the
fee simple" in severalty,227 one must recognize that a cotenant will sel-
dom, if ever, deliberately undertake in "bad faith" to acquire, by adverse
possession, sole ownership of land held in cotenancy. Hence, in the great
majority of cases, the occupying cotenant will necessarily have been in
possession in the "honest belief" that he is the sole owner of the land.
This is true whether or not the occupying cotenant ultimately succeeds in
establishing ownership by adverse possession. Thus the fact that the oc-
cupying possessor acted in "good faith" in most of the cases in which he
succeeded in acquiring title by adverse possession does not demonstrate
that "good faith" is either a necessary or material factor in judicial deci-
sions on the point, or that "bad faith" would prove fatal to an adverse
claimant's effort to acquire title by adverse possession.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of th6 recent cases relied upon by Professor
Helmholz demonstrates that there is no tenable basis for his broad con-
clusion that the American courts in recent times have consistently
reached results inconsistent with generally accepted views as to the rele-
vance of "accrual of a cause of action," the "subjective intent" of the
adverse claimant, and-most significantly-the "good faith" or "bad
faith" of the adverse claimant. Many of the cases either reach a result
contrary to that for which they are cited228 or simply do not involve the
issue Professor Helmholz asserts that they involve. 229 The two recent
cases adopting the "Connecticut rule" as to the effect of a landowner's
possession of a neighbor's land under a "mistaken, but honest belief' that
226. Collier v. Welker, 19 N.C. App. 617, 199 S.E.2d 691 (1973), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 355 n.93. With "color of title," the statutory limitation period in North Carolina is 7
years, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1983); and without "color of title" the period is 20 years, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-40 (1983).
227. Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 354.
228. See, eg., Moss v. James, 411 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1967), cited in Adverse Possession, supra note
1, at 342 n.48; Hoppe v. Sauter, 416 S.W.2d 912 (rex. Civ. App. 1967), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 344 n.59; Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970), cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note 1, at 343 n.53.
229. See, eg., SSM Inv. v. Siemers, 291 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. 1980), cited in Adverse Possession,
supra note 1, at 345 n.62; Grimstad v. Dordan, 256 Or. 135, 471 P.2d 778 (1970), cited in Adverse
Possession, supra note 1, at 345 n.62.
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the possessor owns the land23° fail to provide any support whatever for
Professor Helmholz's assertion that the courts "regularly award title to
the good faith trespasser, where they will not award it to the trespasser
who knows what he is doing at the time he enters the land in dispute."
Similarly, the cases denying claims of title by adverse possession on the
ground that the claimant's possession was "somehow less than suffi-
cient," or on the ground that the claimant's possession was "permissive,"
or on the ground that the claimant "knew enough of the true state of the
title to offer money to the record owner" fail to provide substantial sup-
port for Professor Helmholz's conclusions.231 In most of the cases of the
latter types, the stated grounds of decisions adequately justify the result,
and no apparent reason exists to attribute to the courts a disingenuous
intent to conceal the "true" basis of their decisions.232
Assuming that the number of adverse possession cases decided in ap-
pellate courts during the period surveyed by Professor Helmholz is larger
than one might expect in a field of law where the rules are supposedly
well-settled, 233 how can the substantial volume of litigation be explained?
In all probability, it is a result of the continuing confusion of the courts
as to the meaning of the "claim of right" requirement.234 The cases in
230. See Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 424 A.2d 1144 (1981), cited in Adverse Possession, supra
note 1, at 340 n.37; Mannillo v. Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258 (1969), cited in Adverse Posses-
sion, supra note 1, at 340 n.36.
231. See supra notes 138-75 and accompanying text.
232. In the few cases in which the court adverts to the fact that the adverse claimant did not
honestly believe that he owned the land in question, the other factors were arguably sufficient to
justify the result. But in most of the cases there is no reference to the adverse claimant's lack of
"good faith." Unless one starts with an assumption that "good faith" or "bad faith" are decisive, or
at least of great significance, the reasonable conclusion is that "good faith" and "bad faith" are not
relevant in such cases.
233. As suggested supra note 5 and accompanying text, the number of adverse possession cases
during the period Professor Helmholz surveyed does not seem to be greatly in excess of the number
of bailment cases decided during the same period.
234. See supra note 75. The idea that the "claim of right" must be rightful was repudiated in
Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 610 (N.Y. 1840); thereafter American courts generally
have held that a "claim of right" is sufficient whether it is asserted in "good faith" or in "bad faith."
See also 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7 at § 1147:
It has been said that by claim of right or title, in connection with the doctrine of adverse
possession, is meant merely 'an intention to appropriate and hold the land as owner, and to
the exclusion, rightfully or wrongfully, of every one else.' It is most unfortunate, if this is
the idea which the courts intend to convey, that they use language which on its face means
something entirely different. The presence of such an intention to appropriate is no doubt
necessary for the purpose of adverse possession, but this is... not because without it the
possession would not be adverse, but because without it there would be no possession.
l at 791.
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which a dispute exists as to the ownership of a strip of land owned by one
landowner but actually possessed by an abutting landowner for the statu-
tory limitation period (Le., cases in which the courts are divided between
the "Maine rule" and the "Connecticut rule" with respect to the effect of
a "mistaken, but honest belief' of the possessor that he owned the land in
dispute) clearly demonstrate this confusion. 235  A case236 in which the
New York Court of Appeals held that the adverse claimant had failed to
prove the "actual . . .occupation of premises under a claim of title"
required by the applicable statute of limitations may constitute the epit-
ome of this confusion. Given the majority's view of the facts, the court
could have based its decision simply on the conclusion that proof of "ac-
tual" possession as defined in the statute was lacking. But the majority
also seems to have thought that the required "claim of title" was lacking
both with respect to a part of the premises upon which the adverse claim-
ant had built a shack, and with respect to another part of the premises
upon which his garage encroached. With respect to the first portion of
the premises the court apparently thought the claimant had no "claim of
right" because he knew the land did not belong to him; and, with respect
to the second portion of the premises, the court apparently thought that
he had no "claim of right" because he thought the land did belong to
him.237 As one commentator observed, the majority opinion might lead
one to "conclude that the only true adverse possessor is one who, with
235. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
236. Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 106 N.E.2d 28, reh. denied, 304 N.Y. 590, 107
N.E.2d 82 (1952).
237. See 304 N.Y. at 98-99, 106 N.E.2d at 31-32, in which the court said:
According to the proof the small shed or shack was located on the subject premises about
14 feet from the Lutz boundary line.., and, as Lutz himself testified, he knew at the time
it was not on his land and, his wife, a defendant here, also testified to the same effect.
The statute requires as an essential element of proof, recognized as fundamental on the
concept of adversity since ancient times, that the occupation of premises by "under a claim
of title."... [When this is] lacking [possession] will not operate to bar the legal title.., no
matter how long the occupation may have continued.
Similarly, the garage encroachment, extending a few inches over the boundary line, fails
to supply proof of occupation by improvement. Lutz himself testified that when he built
the garage he had no survey and thought he was getting it on his own property, which
certainly falls short of establishing that he did it under a claim of title hostile to the true
owner.
Id.
Although the quoted passage shows confusion of the issue whether a statutorily defined "actual"
possession existed with the issue whether the statute's "claim of title" requirement was met, the
court seems to have thought that the adverse claimant lacked "claim of title" to either part of the
tract.
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respect to the title of the land, has no views whatever." '238
The substantial amount of adverse possession litigation in recent years
may also reflect the fact that it is often difficult to determine, in adverse
possession cases, whether the adverse claimant's acts amounted to "ac-
tual possession" or only to a series of separate trespasses; 239 whether the
claimant's possession was "permissive" and therefore not "adverse" at its
inception and, if so, whether the claimants' later conduct converted pos-
session into an "adverse" possession;24 and whether the claimant's con-
duct subsequently converted a possession that was prima facie "adverse"
at its inception into a "permissive" possession. 241' These are difficult fac-
tual questions. The cases that Professor Helmholz cites do not justify the
conclusion that, in close cases, the courts simply decide for "good faith"
claimants and against "bad faith" claimants.
Professor Helmholz concedes that a substantial number of the cases he
surveyed do, in fact, hold that an adverse claimant who acts in "bad
faith" may nevertheless acquire title by adverse possession, but he argues
that "equitable" considerations rather than "the principle that the state
of mind of the possessor is irrelevant" explain the result in many of these
cases.2 42 However, as has been demonstrated, a careful reading of these
cases shows that they do not support Professor Helmholz's argument.24 3
238. C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 10 (1961). The author suggests the relevance of
"subjective factors" other than "good faith" and "bad faith" on the basis of his examination of the
briefs in Van Valkenburgh:
... Lutz's actions according to the brief of the plaintiff "were typical of an irresponsible
squatter, guided by motives of pure expediency.... [He] did nothing to improve the land
but littered the woods around his house with filth and junk, brought in by scavenging the
dump. On the other hand the plaintiff... is merely trying to obtain the normal rights of
ownership.., and to protect his home by cleaning up the neighborhood." The defendants'
brief looks at the matter differently. In their view, the plaintiff "obviously manifesting his
self-proclaimed superiority to poor people, ... means... to clear the neighborhood of the
Lutz family who were born, nourished and grew to manhood and womanhood there long
before Van Valkenburgh took it upon himself to attempt, at all costs, to drive them out."
Id. at 8-9.
239. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 342-43 nn.47-51. For an extensive citation of earlier
cases, see 2 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at § 765; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at § 1138; 5 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 15, at § 2542.
240. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 343-44 nn.54-58. For an extensive citation of earlier
cases, see 3 AM. L. PROP., supra note 7, at §§ 15.6-.7; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at §§ 1178-90.0; 5
G. THOMPSON, supra note 15, at § 2548.
241. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 346-47 nn.63-66. See also 3 AM. L. PROP., supra
note 7 § 15.9 at 810-12 nn.16-21; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 7, at §§ 1163-66; 5 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 15 § 2552 at 663-64 nn.34-42.
242. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 347-48.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 176-81.
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Moreover, it is worth noting that all of the cases Professor Helmholz
cites on this point were, in substance, actions in which the adverse pos-
sessor sought to "quiet title" against the record owner of the land in
question;2' and that a substantial majority of the other cases Professor
Helmholz cites in support of his broader conclusions were also in sub-
stance actions to "quiet title."24 Although statutes in most jurisdictions
244. See Adverse Possession, supra note 1, at 348 nn.69-72. All of these cases involved either an
adverse claimant's action (or, in a few, a counterclaim) to "quiet title," although in some cases the
type of relief sought was differently described, eg., "to establish adverse title" or "to determine
ownership". What are, in substance, actions to "quiet title" may be called a variety of names in
different jurisdictions, including, in addition to those just mentioned, actions to "determine a bound-
ary" or to "confirm title". In Texas, an adverse claimant in possession may bring an action of
"trespass to try title" in order to establish a title based on adverse possession for the statutory limita-
tion period.
245. An examination of most of the cases Professor Helmholz cited as directly supporting his
conclusions as to the "subjective intent," "good faith," and "bad faith" of adverse claimants indi-
cates that, in substance, the following cases involved an adverse claimant's attempt to "quiet title"
against the record owner: See Chapman v. Moser, 532 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1976; Gary v. Dane, 411
F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1969); M.C. Dixon Lumber Co. v. Mathison, 289 Ala. 229, 266 So. 2d 841
(1972); Kittrell v. Scarborough, 287 Ala. 155, 249 So. 2d 814 (1971); Ayers v. Day & Night Fuel
Co., 451 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1969); Conwell v. Allen, 21 Ariz. App. 383, 519 P.2d 872 (1974); Barclay
v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 532 S.W.2d 193 (1976); Davis v. Mayweather, 255 Ark. 966, 504 S.W.2d
741 (1974); Corn Ins. Agency v. Darby Builders, 254 Ark. 1004, 497 S.W.2d 260 (1973); Clark v.
Mathis, 253 Ark. 416, 486 S.W.2d 77 (1972); Massey v. Price, 252 Ark. 617, 480 S.W.2d 337 (1972);
Vick v. Berg, 251 Ark. 573, 473 S.W.2d 858 (1971); Dillaha v. Temple, 590 S.W.2d 331 (Ark. App.
1917); Anderson v. Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 170 Colo. 7, 458 P.2d 756 (1969); DeCola v.
Bochatey, 161 Colo. 95, 420 P.2d 395 (1966); Brehm v. Johnson, 531 P.2d 991 (Colo. App. 1974);
Niles v. Churchill, 29 Colo. App. 2d 283, 482 P.2d 994 (1971); Loewenberg v. Wallace, 151 Conn.
355, 197 A.2d 634 (1964); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 537 P.2d 631 (1975); Joiner v. Janssen,
85 Ill. 2d 74, 421 N.W.2d 170 (1981); Patient v. Stief, 49 Ill. App. 3d 99, 363 N.E.2d 927 (1977);
Ewald v. Horenberger, 37 Ill. App. 3d 348, 345 N.E.2d 524 (1976); Guinzy v. Kratz, 28 Ill. App. 3d
500, 328 N.E.2d 699 (1975); Ford v. Eckert, 406 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. App. 1980); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. Martin, 170 Ind. App. 519, 353 N.E.2d 474 (1976); Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782
(Iowa 1982); Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 199 A.2d 109 (1964); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass.
App. 151, 392 N.E.2d 853 (1979); Dunlop v. Twin Beach Park Ass'n, 111 Mich. App. 261, 314
N.W.2d 578 (1982); Whitehall Leather Co. v. Capek, 4 Mich. App. 52, 143 N.W.2d 779 (1966); SSM
Invs. v. Siemers, 291 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. 1980); Woodall v. Ross, 317 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 1975);
Hardy v. Lynch, 258 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1972); Bayless v. Alexander, 245 So. 2d 17 (Miss. 1971);
Quates v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 803 (Miss. 1970); Coleman v. French, 233 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1970);
Allen v. Thomas, 215 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1968); Roth v. Flieg, 536 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1976); Walker v.
Walker, 509 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1974); Wilton Boat Club v. Hazell, 502 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1973); Crane
v. Loy, 436 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. 1968); Moss v. James, 411 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1967); Ross v. McNeal,
618 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. App. 1981); Monnig v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. App. 1981); John v.
Turner, 542 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1976); Cash v. Gilbreath, 507 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. App. 1974);
Martin v. Randono, 175 Mont. 321, 573 P.2d 1156 (1977); Magelssen v. Atwater, 152 Mont. 409,
451 P.2d 103 (1969); Barnes v. Milligan, 200 Neb. 450, 264 N.W.2d 186 (1978); Foos v. Reuter, 180
Neb. 301, 142 N.W.2d 552 (1966); Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 424 A.2d 1144 (1981); Mannillo v.
Gorski, 54 N.J. 378, 255 A.2d 258 (1969); Brylinski v. Cooper, 95 N.M. 580, 624 P.2d 522 (1981);
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now authorize actions to quiet title, they are "equitable" in origin and
character.246 Thus it would not be surprising to find the courts paying
attention to "equitable considerations" when the object of the adverse
possessor is to "quiet" a title acquired by adverse possession.247 What is
surprising is that "equitable considerations" are so seldom mentioned in
the cases.248
Gerwitz v. Gelsomin, 69 A.D.2d 992, 416 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979); Lewis v. Village of Lyons, 54
A.D.2d 488, 389 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976); Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 370 N.Y.S.2d 237
(1975); West v. Tilley, 33 A.D.2d 228, 306 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1970); Collier v. Welker, 19 N.C. App.
617, 199 S.E.2d 691 (1973); Tindle v. Linville, 512 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1973); Leach v. West, 504 P.2d
1233 (Okla. 1972); Caywood v. January, 455 P.2d 49 (Okla. 1969); Venator v. Ouidf, 285 Or. 19, 589
P.2d 731 (1979); Nedry v. Morgan, 284 Or. 65, 584 P.2d 1381 (1978); Beaver v. Davis, 275 Or. 209,
550 P.2d 428 (1976); Grimstad v. Dordan, 256 Or. 135, 471 P.2d 778 (1970); Foss v. Paulson, 255
Or. 167, 465 P.2d 221 (1970); White v. Chandler, 52 Or. App. 951, 630 P.2d 372 (1981); Breuer v.
Covert, 47 Or. App. 225, 614 P.2d 1169 (1980); Garrett v. Lundgren, 41 Or. App. 23, 596 P.2d 1317
(1979); Spangler v. Schaus, 106 R.I. 795, 264 A.2d 161 (1970); Morgan v. Dillard, 61 Tenn. App.
519, 456 S.W.2d 359 (1970); Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn. App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769 (1965); Wolgamot v.
Corley, 523 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Hensz v. Linnstaedt, 501 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); McDonald v. Batson, 501 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Nagel v. Hopingardner, 464
S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Lundelius v. Thompson, 461 S.W.2d 153 (rex. Civ. App. 1971);
Hoppe v. Sauter, 416 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981);
Holbrook v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 288, 431 P.2d 123 (1967); Walton v. Rosson, 216 Va. 732, 222
S.E.2d 553 (1976); Howard v. Kunto, 2 Wash. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970); Somon v. Murphy
Fabrication & Erection Co., 232 S.E.2d 524 (W. Va. 1977); Beasley v. Knoczal, 87 Wis. 2d 233, 275
N.W.2d 634 (1979); Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1978); Petrusic v. Carson, 496 P.2d 70
(Wyo. 1972).
246. "Defendant's counterclaim is in the nature of a suit to quiet title, which is an equitable
proceeding. ORS 105.605. Because the issues raised on appeal all relate to defendant's counter-
claim, we treat the appeal, as have the parties, as an appeal from an equitable decree." Nedry v.
Morgan, 284 Or. 65 n.1, 584 P.2d 1381 n.1 (1978).
For a full historical account of the development and present status of "equitable" and statutory
actions to "quiet title," see I POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 246 & 1395-99 (5th ed. Sy-
mons 1941). See also MCCLINTocK, EQUITY ch. 19 (2d ed. 1948); WALSH, EQUITY § 117 (1930).
247. A few early cases denied "quiet title" relief to a plaintiff claiming title by adverse posses-
sion. See, e.g., Taylor v. Staples, 8 R.I. 170, 181 (1865) ("if a party has acquired another's land
under the Statute of Possessions, he ought to be content with the title which the Statute gives him,
and... he cannot, without some further equity, reinforce it by coming into chancery to compel a
release of the title which he has superseded." This language was quoted in Day v. Proprietors of
Swan Point Cemetery, 51 R.I. 213, 216-7, 153 A. 312, 313 (1931), in which the court also intimated
that "color of title" plus "additional equities" would give the adverse possessor an "equitable" right
to have his title by adverse possession "quieted." Id. See also Contee v. Lyons, 19 D.C. 207 (1890);
McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889); Miller v. Robertson, 35 Can. Sup. Ct. 80 (1904).
All three cases held that an adverse claimant does not have an "equitable" right to have his title
"'quieted." But as the cases cited supra note 245 clearly demonstrate, the great weight of authority is
now to the contrary.
For a collection of pre-1932 cases, see Annot. 78 A.L.R. 24, 110-16 (1932).
248. The only case cited by Professor Helmholz in which the court clearly recognized the rele-
vance of"equitable considerations" is Gary v. Dane, 411 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1969), holding that the
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claimant's title to a strip of land along the edge of his neighbor's lot was "established by adverse
possession, although the adverse possession was the result of an honest mistake as to the boundary."
The court also held, however, that "[hie who demands equity must do it" and, therefore, that "the
declaration of title" in the adverse claimant should be conditioned both on his reimbursing the
former owner for back taxes and his granting to the former owner "an easement allowing reasonable
use of the strip [awarded to the adverse claimant] for wall maintenance, continued clearance for the
exhaust fan, and continued drainage for [the former owner's] back lot." Id. at 715.
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